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CONSUMER REMEDIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
KATE SABLOSKY ELENGOLD 
ABSTRACT 
This Article considers whether the consumer protection doctrine offers a more 
promising avenue to remedying certain forms of discrimination than the 
antidiscrimination doctrine. Using a housing discrimination story as a case 
study, this Article breaks down the doctrinal trade-offs between seeking redress 
through a consumer protection claim and an antidiscrimination claim. This 
Article argues that a consumer protection claim is not only a viable avenue to 
remedying certain forms of discrimination but also has a higher likelihood of 
success than a traditional antidiscrimination claim. 
Consumer protection claims might appear undesirable because they lack the 
important anti-subordination and group-based equality norms at the root of civil 
rights law. This Article argues that this is something of an illusion. Civil rights 
advocacy historically focused on economic citizenship, but formal civil rights 
doctrine came to omit economic protections. The antidiscrimination doctrine 
developed narrowly, constraining the reach of its remedies. Antidiscrimination 
statutes thus have failed to reach advocates’ aspiration for achieving group-
based equality. Consumer protection law, solidly grounded in the protection of 
economic citizenship, is well-suited to those aspirations. Consumer protection 
claims therefore usefully align with and supplement the objectives of civil rights 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Julia Forman is a forty-two-year-old Black woman.1 She is seeking an 
apartment in Raleigh, North Carolina. She reads about an open two-bedroom 
apartment at Orange Haven Apartments on rent.com that is available for $750 
per month. The apartment building is old and near a highway, but it has 
amenities, including a pool, workout facility, and in-unit laundry. It is also near 
a bus stop, which would allow Julia easy access to employment opportunities. 
The neighborhood in Raleigh is racially diverse, but a recent influx of upper-
class White families has led to quicker responses from emergency services, 
community and economic development, and a high-end grocery store. Julia goes 
to the apartment complex to inquire about the available apartment. The landlord, 
Bill Herman, tells Julia that all of the two-bedroom units have been rented, but 
that a one-bedroom apartment might be coming available in the following 
month. He quotes her $800 per month for the one-bedroom apartment. Bill does 
not ask Julia about her income or credit history and tells her to check back in 
three weeks if she is still interested. 
Julia checks the rent.com listing when she gets home and notes that the two-
bedroom apartment at Orange Haven Apartments is still listed as available. 
Suspicious, she asks her friend George Simon, a forty-five-year-old White man, 
to swing by the apartment complex on his way home from work to see if he can 
get any information about either the two-bedroom or one-bedroom apartment. 
When George arrives, he too is greeted by Bill Herman. Bill informs George 
that, indeed, he has a two-bedroom unit available and quotes him the same price 
listed on rent.com―$750 per month. He also tells George that he has a one-
bedroom apartment available, offers to show him the apartment, and tells George 
that it rents for $650 per month. When George leaves the apartment complex, 
Bill sends him off with a rental application and lets George know that he will 
follow up in the next couple of days. Bill never asks about George’s income or 
credit history.2 
 
1 For reasons I set forth in an earlier work, I choose to capitalize the terms “Black” and 
“White” unless they appear in a quotation. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity, 
93 DENV. L. REV. 1, 6 n.19 (2015). In keeping with the trend of omitting hyphens when using 
terms that combine ethnicities or nationalities, I also employ the term “African American” 
without a hyphen. Id. 
2 This case study is a hypothetical. The facts, however, are representative of fair housing 
cases from around the country. Julia’s visit to the apartment complex, followed by George’s 
visit to the apartment complex, is similar to testing that is designed to uncover subtle housing 
discrimination. Courts have recognized the legitimacy of testing such evidence in housing 
discrimination cases. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982) (“That 
the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive 
false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the 
simple fact of injury . . . .”). Reputable organizations, including the United States Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”), have entire teams devoted to fair housing testing. See Fair Housing 
Testing Program, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/crt/fair-housing-testing-program-1 [https:// 
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This Article uses Julia’s story as a tool to consider whether the consumer 
protection doctrine affords a viable avenue to remedy discrimination, especially 
for individual plaintiffs.3 It analyzes Julia’s experience under both an 
 
perma.cc/M4AY-8RFQ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that testing is a valuable tool to 
investigate housing market practices and to document illegal housing discrimination); see also 
Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage Lending Discrimination Cases, 41 
URB. LAW. 319, 321 (2009) (“Testing is specifically authorized in the Fair Housing Act under 
the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) and the Fair Housing Assistance Program 
(FHAP), each of which is administered and managed by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD).”). For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted 
testing evidence in a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) case, including one test where a Black tester 
was informed that a one-bedroom apartment was $500 per month and a White tester was later 
informed that the same apartment was $480 per month. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 
916, 924 (7th Cir. 1992) (accepting “testing” as method of ferreting out discrimination and 
explaining how it was used in this case). Testers were also used in Metro Fair Housing 
Services, Inc. v. Morrowood Garden Apartments, Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1090 (N.D. Ga. 1983), 
where a resident manager told the Black tester that no two-bedroom apartments were available 
and that she could place her name on a waitlist for a one-bedroom apartment; he then told the 
White tester that no two-bedroom would be available until fall but that a one-bedroom 
apartment would be available the following month. Id. at 1095 (denying defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment for plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim); see also Miller v. Spring 
Valley Props., 202 F.R.D. 244, 246-47 (C.D. Ill. 2001) (detailing how apartment rental agent 
allegedly misrepresented availability of apartments to African Americans at several 
properties); Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 337-38 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (explaing how 
apartment agent told Black applicants that there were no units available to rent when, in fact, 
there were twenty appropriate units vacant at property). Unlike the amateur test Julia and 
George put together, most tests undertaken by professional fair housing investigators would 
isolate one variable protected class (i.e., race or sex). See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. 
OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, Paired Testing and the Housing Discrimination Studies, 
EVIDENCE MATTERS (2014), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring14/high 
light2.html [https://perma.cc/8BP5-6RZY]. Julia’s situation, however, more accurately 
describes the set of facts and circumstances that an individual prospective renter might face 
in trying to determine whether he or she has been the victim of housing discrimination or an 
unfair or deceptive act. 
3 While this Article focuses on a particular case study, it does so to illustrate the costs and 
benefits of two statutory schemes and doctrines. It looks to the federal FHA to illuminate the 
benefits and risks of using antidiscrimination law to remedy civil rights violations. It looks to 
state unfair and deceptive practices acts to illuminate the benefits and risks of using consumer 
protection law to remedy civil rights violations. While not every fact pattern involving 
discriminatory conduct could take advantage of the analysis herein, this Article is relevant to 
myriad fact patterns and multiple laws. For further analysis, see infra notes 21-22, 237-244 
and accompanying text (explaining how consumer protection doctrine offers a plausible 
means of remedying discrimination under several causes of action). More importantly, the 
Article concludes that consumer protection claims can and should be utilized as a tool for 
achieving civil rights, especially in light of the historical inability of antidiscrimination law 
to fully reach its anti-subordination and group-based equality goals. Such a conclusion is 
unconstrained by the specifics of the case study used to develop and illustrate its analysis. 
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antidiscrimination and a consumer protection framework, setting out the 
doctrinal benefits and drawbacks of pursuing each claim. It argues not only that 
a consumer protection claim is a viable avenue to remedying certain forms of 
discrimination commonly considered under traditional antidiscrimination law, 
but also that such an approach has fewer hurdles to clear and a higher likelihood 
of success than a traditional civil rights claim. 
Substituting a consumer protection claim for a traditional civil rights claim is 
not, however, without normative implications. A consumer protection approach 
is a universalist approach to remedying discrimination. In other words, its 
remedies are available to all people without regard to identity-based protected 
classes.4 Such approaches can be, and have been, critiqued for failing to achieve 
anti-subordination or group-based equality goals inherent in civil rights 
protections.5 Primarily, critics contend that universalist approaches adopt, and 
thus condone, a post-racial, colorblind perception of modern America.6 This 
Article recognizes the value and legitimacy of such arguments. Even so, it argues 
that the history of civil rights advocacy and the failure of the antidiscrimination 
doctrine to achieve group-based equality goals counsels toward enlarging the 
legal mechanisms for achieving civil rights remedies. Further, the historic 
understanding of economic citizenship7 as a measure of full and free 
participation in a democratic society suggests that consumer protection can—
and should—be a primary tool in the fight for equality.8 
Part I of this Article analyzes the doctrinal relationship between 
antidiscrimination and consumer protection jurisprudence. It asks: (1) can one 
use consumer protection law to remedy discrimination and (2) what are the 
trade-offs between an antidiscrimination claim and a consumer protection 
claim? Offering Julia’s case as an example, this Article considers the elements 
and the remedies of an antidiscrimination claim under the federal Fair Housing 
 
4 Professor Samuel Bagenstos defines “universalist” and “universalistic” approaches to 
civil rights synonymously as a methodology that “either guarantees a uniform floor of rights 
or benefits for all persons or, at least, guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a broad group of 
people not defined according to the identity axes (e.g., race, sex) highlighted by our 
antidiscrimination laws.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on 
Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842 (2014). 
5 See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of universalist 
approaches to civil rights violations). 
6 Charlotte S. Alexander, Zev J. Eigen & Camille Gear Rich, Post-Racial Hydraulics: The 
Hidden Dangers of the Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2016) (defining “post-racial” 
as “a set of beliefs that coalesce to posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior 
as evidenced by America’s and Americans’ pronounced racial progress”); infra Section III.A 
(explaining how universalist approaches have been criticized as adopting post-racial 
colorblind perception of America). 
7 See infra note 10 (tracing historical development of “economic citizenship” concept). 
8 See infra Section II.A (discussing relationship between economic citizenship and civil 
rights). 
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Act (“FHA”) and of a consumer protection claim under a state law prohibiting 
unfair and deceptive consumer transactions (“UDAP”).9 It concludes that Julia’s 
UDAP claim is not only viable but also more likely to succeed than her 
antidiscrimination claim. The analysis and conclusion of Part I begs the 
normative question: even if consumer protection could provide a path to 
remedying certain forms of discrimination, should scholars, advocates, and 
victims take that path? 
Part II provides context for the normative discussion, exploring the historic 
development of the antidiscrimination doctrine. It makes two relevant 
observations: (1) civil rights advocacy throughout American history has 
promoted economic citizenship as a key component of civil rights and (2) the 
antidiscrimination doctrine has developed narrowly, severing the relationship 
between economic and civil rights, and otherwise constraining the ability of civil 
rights law to achieve anti-subordination and group-based equality goals. 
“Economic citizenship” in this context is defined as “the achievement of an 
independent and relatively autonomous status that marks self-respect and 
provides access to the full play of power and influence that defines participation 
in a democratic society.”10 Finally, Part III tackles the normative question head 
 
9 JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 97-98 (4th ed. 2013) 
(defining and explaining development of state unfair and deceptive consumer practices laws, 
often known as “little FTC acts” or “UDAP statutes”). State statutes have different names, 
different designs, and arose from a variety of models. See Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball 
Disguised as Law Reform: ALEC’s Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer 
Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 286-91 (2015) (recognizing that 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (now known as Uniform Law 
Commission), American Law Institute, and Council of State Governments, drafted model acts 
that were widely used by states as they developed state UDAP laws). For ease of reference, 
this Article refers to state laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive consumer transactions as 
“UDAP statutes.” 
10 ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR 
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (2001) (defining “economic 
citizenship” and discussing it through feminist theory lens). Civil rights activists sought full 
and free access to traditional routes to economic and financial well-being, including access to 
credit, home mortgages, and goods and services. See THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS 
TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1 
(2009) (“Dreams of economic justice had long been central to the black freedom struggle and 
to King’s social gospel vision.”). The concept of “economic citizenship” has been critiqued 
by scholars challenging the “exclusionary tendencies” of citizenship in America and 
internationally. See Mary Condon & Lisa Philipps, Transnational Market Governance and 
Economic Citizenship: New Frontiers for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
105, 113 (2005) (“In addition, post-colonial and critical race scholars have called attention to 
the normative presuppositions of Western concepts of citizenship and the denial of citizenship 
privileges to racialized, colonized, and foreign others.”); Annelise Orleck, Gender, Race, and 
Citizenship Rights: New Views of an Ambivalent History, 29 FEMINIST STUD. 85, 95 (2003) 
(“[N]arrow constructions of U.S. citizenship . . . long excluded more people than they 
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on. It considers what might be gained by turning to consumer protection to 
remedy discrimination. Situated in the literature on colorblind, universalist, and 
race-conscious approaches to civil rights concerns, it also considers what might 
be lost. 
This Article fills a hole in the academic literature about the relationship 
between the antidiscrimination and consumer protection doctrines.11 It suggests 
that, paradoxically, the consumer protection doctrine, a universalist approach to 
remedying economic injustice, might in certain circumstances be a better avenue 
to remedying discrimination than relying on traditional civil rights remedies. 
And it goes one step further, arguing that, in light of the historical economic 
citizenship goals of the civil rights movements and failures of the current 
antidiscrimination doctrine, consumer protection law and advocacy can and 
should be understood as a critical tool in the fight for full and adequate civil 
rights. 
I. ASSESSING THE ALTERNATIVES 
This Part considers whether the consumer protection doctrine can afford a 
legal remedy for victims of discrimination. Using Julia’s story as a case study, 
 
included.”). Nevertheless, this Article uses the language and lens of “economic citizenship” 
because it best describes the overlapping language and principles of the civil rights and 
consumer movements of the mid-twentieth century. See MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS: 
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 150-64 (2005) (recognizing unique 
coalitions in the wake of the New Deal that centered around desire to increase consumer 
purchasing power); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123 
YALE L.J. 2698, 2701 (2014) (recognizing how economic justice-minded leaders in civil 
rights movement pushed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others to include a vision of 
economic citizenship as part of civil rights movement platform); William E. Forbath, Civil 
Rights and Economic Citizenship: Notes on the Past and Future of the Civil Rights and Labor 
Movements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 697, 702-09 (2000) (tracing concept of economic 
citizenship through overlapping civil rights and labor movements). As used in this Article, 
the concept of “economic citizenship” bears no relationship to one’s legal status in America. 
11 Although there has been significant academic treatment of the relationship between the 
labor movement and the civil rights movement, see, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 10, at 15-23 
(discussing Dr. King’s role in labor movement), the role of the consumer movement in that 
conversation has been largely ignored. And while scholars have considered discrimination in 
retail, car sales, and lending, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: 
DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 15-43 (1992) (retail); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race 
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818 (1991) (car sales); 
Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to Simplify Federal Mortgage 
Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 529 (1993) (lending); Deseriee 
A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 
66 MO. L. REV. 275, 276 (2001) (retail); Robert G. Schwemm, Introduction to Mortgage 
Lending Discrimination Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 332 (1995) (lending), outside of 
lending discrimination, there has been little attention paid to the overlap of the 
antidiscrimination and consumer protection doctrines. 
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it argues that both antidiscrimination and consumer protection doctrine afford 
Julia legal remedies to vindicate her rights. It then breaks down the doctrinal 
trade-offs between a consumer protection claim and a traditional 
antidiscrimination claim. It concludes that, due in large part to the original 
design of the consumer protection and antidiscrimination statutes and their 
subsequent doctrinal development, the consumer protection doctrine affords 
individual victims of discrimination an easier path to and greater likelihood of 
attaining a remedy under law. Although this Part focuses its attention on Julia’s 
story of housing discrimination, the analysis in this Article is not limited to such 
specific factual situations—the final section of this Part briefly explores 
additional applications. 
A. The Claims 
1. The Antidiscrimination Claim 
The relevant antidiscrimination statutes under which Julia’s claim could arise 
are the federal FHA,12 the North Carolina State Fair Housing Act,13 or both. The 
FHA prohibits discrimination in any dwelling, private or public, intended as a 
residence for one or more families, including vacant land on which a residence 
might be placed.14 The FHA prohibits discrimination based on certain protected 
classes—race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and 
 
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012) (laying out general policy of United States to provide 
for fair housing). 
13 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41A-1 to 41A-10 (2018). Like many state fair housing statutes, the 
North Carolina State Fair Housing Act parallels the protections in the federal FHA. Compare 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4 (prohibiting discrimination related to housing because of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, handicapping condition, or familial status), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604 (prohibiting discrimination related to housing because of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, handicap, or familial status). Most states and many localities have analog fair 
housing statutes, some of which prohibit discrimination on the basis of additional protected 
classes. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (2015) (protected classes include race, color, 
religion, creed, sex, national origin/ancestry, disability/handicap, sexual orientation (defined 
to include “transgender status”), marital status, and familial status); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-
107 (2018) (including as protected classes race, color, religion/creed, national origin, 
disability, sexual orientation, marital or partnership status, age, alienage or citizenship status, 
gender, gender identity, lawful occupation, lawful source of income, pregnancy, presence of 
children, and status as victim of domestic violence). For ease of reference, the remainder of 
the Section assumes that an antidiscrimination claim is made pursuant to the federal FHA. 
14 The FHA defines “dwelling” as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is 
occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, 
and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon 
of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(b), 3603(a)(2) 
(defining dwelling to include, after Dec. 31, 1968, all public and private dwellings not 
otherwise exempted). 
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disability.15 Specifically, the FHA prohibits a landlord or other housing provider 
from refusing to sell or rent housing; making housing unavailable; 
discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental; making or 
publishing a statement indicating a preference or limitation of resident; and/or 
falsely telling a prospective resident that housing is unavailable because of such 
individual’s membership in a specified protected class.16 Courts have read the 
fair housing protections broadly, especially the prohibition against “otherwise 
mak[ing] unavailable or deny[ing] a dwelling.”17  
To prevail on her claim of housing discrimination, Julia would need to 
establish that Bill Herman: (1) made the apartment unavailable to her; (2) 
discriminated against her in the terms or conditions of the rental; and/or (3) 
represented to her that the two-bedroom apartment was not available, even 
though it was ready for occupancy. Julia would also need to establish that Bill 
took those actions because of her race, color, and/or sex. To prove improper 
motive, Julia would likely rely on the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green.18 She must prove intentional discrimination based on her membership 
in a protected class and subclass. 
 
15 Id. § 3604. 
16 Id. § 3604(a)-(d). The FHA also prohibits steering, discrimination in real estate 
transactions, and failure to design and construct housing built after 1991 in accordance with 
accessibility requirements, among other prohibitions. Id. §§ 3604(e)-(f), 3605 (setting forth 
accessibility requirements and prohibiting discrimination in residential real estate-related 
transactions). 
17 Id. § 3604(a); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1995) 
(recognizing the FHA’s “‘broad and inclusive’ compass” and “according a ‘generous 
construction’ to the Act’s complaint-filing provision” (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972))); Nat’l Fair Hous. All., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[P]laintiffs persuasively argue that it 
would have been unreasonable for Congress to include a laundry list of all possible housing-
related transactions covered by the FHA, and that the broad, general language—reflected in 
phrases such as ‘otherwise make unavailable or deny’—was intended to be flexible enough 
to cover multiple types of housing-related transactions.”); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 
1169, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (interpreting phrase “otherwise make unavailable or deny a 
dwelling” to be “as broad as Congress could have made it”). 
18 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). For further explanation, see infra Section I.B.1 (explaining 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and burden-shifting framework). Courts have looked at 
the specific facts of FHA cases to determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded and 
proved intentional discrimination, looking to McDonnell Douglas as a “sensible, orderly way 
to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of 
discrimination.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) 
(noting that McDonnell Douglas framework was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or 
ritualistic” (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))). Julia could 
also rely on the “mixed-motive” test developed in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989) superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), to establish that she was a victim of housing 
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2. The Consumer Protection Claim 
Julia may have multiple consumer protection claims arising from her 
experience at Orange Haven Apartments. Most clearly, she could bring state law 
claims under a state UDAP statute or pursuant to a common law or statutory 
fraud claim. 
To make out a claim of fraud in North Carolina, Julia would need to establish: 
(1) false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably 
calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to deceive, (4) which did in fact 
deceive, (5) resulting in damage to her.19 Because fraud is widely recognized as 
a difficult claim to win,20 the remainder of this Section focuses on a claim under 
a UDAP statute.21 
To make out a claim under the North Carolina UDAP statute, Julia must 
establish: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting 
 
discrimination. Id. at 244-45 (holding that once plaintiff “shows that gender played a 
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability 
only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender 
to play such a role”). Price Waterhouse was superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
section 107, which allows an employment discrimination claim to proceed if the plaintiff 
establishes that her protected class status was a “motivating factor” in the adverse employment 
action, even where other factors were also considered. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1074, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)). Not all civil 
rights claims can take advantage of mixed-motive findings. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176-77 (2009) (holding that age must be “but for” cause of discrimination 
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Gross has not (yet) been extended to the 
FHA. See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 616 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Although 
Gross may cast doubt on this conclusion, by its terms, Gross applies only to the ADEA, and 
we decline to address whether Gross applies to the FHA in the absence of clearer guidance 
from the Supreme Court.”). 
19 Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (N.C. 1974) (laying out five-prong test). 
20 Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the 
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 48-51 (2005) (exposing difficult hurdles inherent 
in making out common law fraud claim and recognizing that federal and state unfair and 
deceptive trade practices statutes fill in gaps to remedy such violations); Dee Pridgen, The 
Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and Private Enforcement of Unfair and 
Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 917 (2017). 
21 The goal of this Article is not to set forth a litigation plan for those seeking to use UDAP 
statutes to pursue discrimination remedies; rather, this Article is designed to be a thought 
experiment—what would happen if we considered discrimination through the lens of 
consumer law? It matters less whether Julia can make out a specific claim under a specific 
law in a specific state than whether scholars and advocates should consider reframing the 
conversation through a consumer protection, rather than antidiscrimination, framework. If the 
reader is persuaded that the consumer protection doctrine offers a plausible and effective 
means of remedying certain forms of discrimination, including facts similar to those set forth 
in Julia’s story, the reader should consider the possibilities under several consumer protection 
theories, including UDAP and common law fraud. 
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commerce, which (3) proximately caused actual injury to [her].”22 A practice is 
unfair when it “offends established public policy as well as when the practice is 
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to 
consumers.”23 A litigant can also prove a claim under the state UDAP statute by 
showing a “deceptive” act or practice, which is one that “possesse[s] the 
tendency or capacity to mislead, or create[s] the likelihood of deception.”24 
While North Carolina courts have held that the plaintiff must plead and prove 
some kind of egregious or aggravating circumstance beyond a breach of 
contract,25 they have also recognized that a “party is guilty of an unfair act or 
practice when it engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion 
of its power or position.”26 North Carolina and other state courts look to federal 
law construing the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) to define “unfair” 
and “deceptive.”27 As is true in many other states, North Carolina courts have 
applied the state UDAP statute to the relationship between landlords and 
tenants.28 To make out her UDAP claim, Julia would need to establish that Bill 
engaged in at least one unfair or deceptive act. 
 
22 Melton v. Family First Mortg. Corp., 576 S.E.2d 365, 368 (N.C. Ct. App.), aff’d mem., 
597 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. 2003) (citing Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 901 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002)). This is consistent with other state UDAP laws. See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002) (construing Illinois Consumer 
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act to require: (1) deceptive or unfair act or practice 
by defendant, (2) defendant’s intent that plaintiff rely on the deception, and (3) occurrence of 
deception during course of conduct involving trade or commerce). 
23 Melton, 576 S.E.2d at 368 (citing Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (N.C. 1981)). 
24 Id. (citing Overstreet v. Brookland, Inc., 279 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)). 
25 Phelps Staffing, LLC v. C.T. Phelps, Inc., 740 S.E.2d 923, 928 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
The aggravating circumstance requirement generally arises in cases alleging both breach of 
contract and violation of UDAP; the plaintiff must allege something beyond breach of 
contract. See Chapel H.O.M. Assocs., LLC v. RME Mgmt., LLC, 808 S.E.2d 576, 579 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2017) (stating that mere breach of contract is insufficent to establish UDAP claim). 
26 Supplee v. Miller-Motte Bus. Coll., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 582, 598 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) 
(citing McInerney v. Pinehurst Area Realty, Inc., 590 S.E.2d 313, 316-17 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004)). 
27 See, e.g., Martinez v. Freedom Mortg. Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836-37 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007) (looking to FTC’s definition of “unfair” to understand Illinois Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practices Act). 
28 See, e.g., Crawford v. Nawrath, No. 16-cv-15955, 2016 WL 4608184, at *3 (N.C. Ct. 
App. Sept. 6, 2016) (recognizing that “landlord, who collects rent after having knowledge of 
the uninhabitable nature of a house, or just a part of a house, is engaging in unfair trade 
practices in violation of Section 75-1.1”); Stanley v. Moore, 439 S.E.2d 250, 251-52 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 454 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. 1995) (stating it is “clear that 
a tenant is a consumer for purposes of the [UDAP] Act and that the leasing of residential 
property is within the purview of [N.C. GEN. STAT.] § 75-1.1,” and that “landlord” is defined 
as “any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having 
the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by [N.C. GEN. STAT. 
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B. The Design and Doctrine 
This Section argues that the design of the antidiscrimination and consumer 
protection statutes, as the courts have developed and implemented them, 
significantly affects the ability of each doctrine to remedy discrimination. The 
design of antidiscrimination statutes focuses protection on specified protected 
classes—race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability, and familial status, 
for example.29 Although that design might have been meant to root out 
discrimination, the judicial development of the doctrine has constricted and 
limited its usefulness in three primary ways. First, the statutory design limits 
protection to discrete and rigid protected classes, acting as a gatekeeper for its 
protections. The judicial interpretation of that design has limited protection for 
victims of discrimination whose identities fall outside the protected class(es) and 
for victims of discrimination whose identities straddle protected classes 
(“intersectional” or “complex” plaintiffs).30 Second, antidiscrimination statutes 
were designed to prohibit conduct that discriminates “because of” the plaintiff’s 
membership in a protected class. For individual plaintiffs like Julia, that design 
requires proof of intent, which scholars have empirically shown is a significant 
 
§ 42-40]”); Creekside Apartments v. Poteat, 446 S.E.2d 826, 833-34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that landlord’s failure to maintain apartment in habitable condition could form basis 
of UDAP violation). For a catalogue of state UDAP statutes, case law, and their relationship 
to landlord-tenant law, see NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND 
PRACTICES § 2.2.6 (9th ed. 2016), https://library.nclc.org/UDAP [https://perma.cc/DM5G-
HAXU] (cataloguing court decisions finding UDAP applicable to various landlord-tenant 
transactions, including residential lease practices, in numerous states). See also Sager v. Hous. 
Comm’n, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 558-61 (D. Md. 2012) (applying Maryland Consumer 
Protection Act to relationship between tenant and landlord housing authority); Anast v. 
Commonwealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing cases establishing 
application of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act to landlord-
tenant relationships). In some jurisdictions, violation of state landlord-tenant law is a per se 
UDAP violation. See, e.g., 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.17(6)(f) (2014) (stating landlord’s 
interference with tenant’s right of quiet enjoyment is per se UDAP violation). 
29 The laws differ slightly in the designations of protected classes. The FHA prohibits 
discrimination in housing because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, and 
familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for 
example, prohibits discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin. Id. § 2000e-2; supra note 13 (providing examples of protected classes under 
different state laws). 
30 Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 
2494-517 (1994) (defining “complex plaintiffs”); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (defining 
intersectional plaintiffs); Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why 
Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 
301 (2005) (defining “intersectionals” as “persons who are members of more than one ‘low-
status’ category, such as women of color, queer persons of color, or indigent women”). 
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barrier to success under the law, especially for intersectional plaintiffs and 
plaintiffs alleging intersectional discrimination.31 Third, the focus on the 
plaintiff’s identity is at odds with the Supreme Court’s recent turn away from 
robust identity-dependent civil rights protections.32 Taken together, the design 
and doctrinal development of antidiscrimination law has limited and constrained 
the law’s utility in vindicating individual plaintiff’s civil rights. 
This Section also compares the design and doctrine of antidiscrimination law 
to that of consumer protection law. Unlike a plaintiff invoking the 
antidiscrimination doctrine, a plaintiff asserting a consumer protection claim 
need not plead or prove her identity, nor must she connect that identity to the 
defendant’s conduct. Rather, the legal inquiry is squarely and exclusively on 
proving the defendant’s bad act. This Section argues that, because of that design 
difference, consumer protection offers a viable and important avenue for 
remedying certain forms of discrimination. 
 
31 This Article considers the use and role of antidiscrimination and consumer protection 
statutes in individual, rather than class action or pattern-or-practice challenges. While both 
legal structures can challenge large-scale discrimination, see Prigden, supra note 20, at 919-
24 (discussing means of using consumer protection law to achieve group remedies); Shayak 
Sarkar & Josh Rosenthal, Exclusionary Taxation, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 619 
(2018) (arguing policies regarding property tax assessments can be challenged under FHA’s 
disparate impact protections), class actions, organizational plaintiffs, and pattern-or-practice 
cases raise different doctrinal and normative considerations outside this Article’s scope. This 
Article also focuses on intentional, or disparate treatment, discrimination. It limits its analysis 
to disparate treatment not only because it is the appropriate corollary to an individual 
consumer protection claim, but also because scholars have established that disparate impact 
claims are difficult to plead, prove, and win, especially in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
2015 decision in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). See Bethany A. Corbin, Should I Stay or 
Should I Go?: The Future of Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act and 
Implications for the Financial Services Industry, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 421, 460 (2015) 
(recognizing that the Court upheld use of disparate impact under FHA, but that it did so by 
imposing “significant limitations” on its application, including a “robust causality” 
requirement); Justin D. Cummins & Beth Belle Isle, Toward Systemic Equality: 
Reinvigorating a Progressive Application of the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 43 MITCHELL 
HAMLINE L. REV. 102, 132 (2017) (recognizing limits of disparate impact doctrine after key 
Supreme Court cases); Daniel Sheehan, Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing 
Act After Inclusive Communities, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 391, 
392 (2017) (arguing that “majority opinion [in Inclusive Communities], written by Justice 
Kennedy, affirms that the FHA encompasses disparate impact liability for public and private 
actors, but it tightly constrains that liability”). But see Steven M. Dane, The Potential Impact 
of Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project 
on Future Civil Rights Enforcement and Compliance, FED. LAW., July 2016, at 39 (arguing 
that disparate impact theory under FHA was confirmed by and remains potent after Inclusive 
Communities). 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 61-66. 
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1. The Constraints of Antidiscrimination Law’s Design and Doctrine 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,33 followed closely in time by 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.34 Both statutes structured civil rights protections 
around identified protected classes. Those laws require a plaintiff to establish 
that a defendant discriminated against her “because of” her membership in a 
specific protected class.35 The design of the legislation and the doctrine’s 
development have constrained plaintiffs’ ability to remedy discrimination. 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas. In McDonnell 
Douglas, the Court developed a burden shifting analysis to permit civil rights 
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on direct or 
circumstantial evidence. To establish a prima facie case for employment 
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must establish:  
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified 
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite 
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from 
persons of complainant’s qualifications.36  
At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a valid and non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse action.37 If the defendant is successful, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the stated reason is “mere 
pretext” for discrimination.38 In its 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins39 
decision, the Supreme Court also developed a “mixed-motive” analysis, 
 
33 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
34 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012)). 
35 This design is replicated in other civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s age . . . .”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employment.”).  
36 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas 
analysis extends across protected class and has been applied to other antidiscrimination 
statutes, including the FHA. See, e.g., Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
37 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
38 Id. at 798. 
39 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
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whereby a plaintiff can “show[] that gender [or another protected class] played 
a motivating part in an employment decision” to establish liability under 
antidiscrimination law.40 The defendant will be liable unless he can prove that 
he “would have made the same decision even if [he] had not allowed gender to 
play such a role.”41 The test set forth in McDonnell Douglas, supplemented by 
the analysis in Price Waterhouse, acts as the organizing principle for developing, 
pleading, and analyzing statutory civil rights claims.42 
Antidiscrimination law’s protected class design limits the utility of the law—
it operates as both a gatekeeper and a labyrinth for plaintiffs seeking a judicial 
remedy for discrimination.43 First, it is a gatekeeper. To prevail, a civil rights 
plaintiff must establish that she is a member of one of the designated protected 
classes.44 She must also designate and establish her subclass.45 In other words, 
if a plaintiff believes she was discriminated against because she is Black, she 
must state her protected class (i.e., race) and then establish how her membership 
in a subclass (i.e., African American) resulted in differential treatment.46 Only 
then is she even eligible for the protections of the antidiscrimination doctrine. It 
is true that, in certain situations, courts have found violations of 
antidiscrimination law when individuals are aggrieved or injured by 
discrimination based on someone else’s protected class and subclass 
membership, when the plaintiff is in the “zone of interest” protected by the 
 
40 Id. at 244. 
41 Id. at 244-45. For additional explanation, see supra note 18. 
42 See Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 101 (2017) 
(arguing that statutory design of antidiscrimination law does not require that plaintiff prove 
that she is member of protected class to gain access to protections, but that doctrine has 
developed, primarily through application of McDonnell Douglas test, to apply such a 
requirement). 
43 See id. (arguing that “protected class gatekeeping” is undesirable). 
44 The protected classes are limited by the designations identified by Congress or state 
legislatures. For example, the FHA does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, source of income, or 
employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (designating only race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, and national origin as protected classes). 
45 See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 485 (9th Cir. 2014); Elengold, supra note 1, at 4 (“In 
order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that she was treated differently because of her 
membership in a subclass of that protected class.”). 
46 See id. at 4 n.12 (“For example, an African American alleging a violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may allege that she was the victim of discrimination because 
she is African American, a particular bounded subclass of race.”). Certain provisions in the 
civil rights canon also provide for a disparate impact analysis. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. 
and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015). Although 
much of the analysis contained herein is applicable to disparate impact cases, the focus of this 
Article is disparate treatment. 
  
602 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:587 
 
antidiscrimination statutes.47 Even so, the plaintiff must still show intentional 
discrimination because of someone’s membership in a protected class. 
The protected class design limits access to civil rights protections for certain 
plaintiffs and excludes certain experiences of discrimination from its design. 
Most obviously, discrimination on the basis of certain identity traits falls outside 
of the designated protected classes and thus is excluded from protection. Courts 
have dismissed cases where the discrimination occurred because of sexual 
orientation,48 nepotism,49 socioeconomic status,50 and profession.51 
The protected class design is also a labyrinth for victims of discrimination. 
Once the plaintiff clears the gatekeeping hurdle, she must navigate the 
 
47 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011) (finding plaintiff was 
directly injured when his employer retaliated against him because plaintiff’s fiancé/co-worker 
filed sex discrimination claim). 
48 See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir.) (holding that Title VII 
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 
(2017) (mem.); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258-59 (1st Cir. 
1999) (same). But see Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (holding that discrimination on basis of sexual orientation is discrimination based on 
sex in prohibition of Title VII); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (same). 
49 See Sogluizzo v. Local 817, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (“Nepotism of itself does not violate Title VII. To come within the Civil Rights Act, 
nepotism must somehow be related to a pattern of discrimination based on national origin or 
another protected class.”). 
50 See Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1495 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that 
discrimination based on low socioeconomic status is “not actionable under section 504 [of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973]”). 
51 See Simmons v. Braswell, No. 1:98-cv-01357, 1998 WL 333520, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 
19, 1998) (“Title VII does not grant this Court jurisdiction to hear complaints of 
discrimination based upon profession.”). Scholars have argued that the protected class 
categories should be expanded. See ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR 
HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 234 
(2013) (arguing protected class categories should be expanded to include “interraciality”); 
Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex 
Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 111 (2008) (proposing expansion of Title 
VII protections to victims of domestic and sexual violence); Nancy Levit, Changing 
Workforce Demographics and the Future of the Protected Class Approach, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 463, 497 (2012) (discussing “ways that the protected class approach has not 
kept pace with the demographics and lived experiences of an ever-changing workforce”); 
Karen Zakrzewski, The Prevalence of “Look”Ism in Hiring Decisions: How Federal Law 
Should Be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 431, 432 (2005) (proposing appearance-based discrimination be made illegal under 
antidiscrimination law). While this discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, it is relevant 
to highlight antidiscrimination law’s current structural limitations as relative to consumer 
protection law’s flexible protections. 
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procedural and evidentiary maze in connecting the defendant’s bad acts to her 
membership in a protected class and subclass. For most civil rights plaintiffs, 
that means they must prove intentional discrimination connected to membership 
in the identified protected class and subclass. 
Proving intentional discrimination is difficult because much of the evidence 
is circumstantial; there is rarely “smoking gun” evidence of intentional 
discrimination.52 In fact, circumstantial evidence is so important to proving 
claims of discrimination that the Supreme Court built it into the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis.53 Investigating and unearthing evidence of discriminatory 
intent is discovery-intensive, expensive, and time-consuming. 
Even when civil rights plaintiffs do uncover evidence of intentional 
discrimination, they have difficulty convincing a judge or jury to ascribe 
malicious intent.54 Studies show that even when there is direct evidence of 
discrimination, judges and juries are generally unwilling to “characterize a 
particular set of events as discrimination” if there is any other possible 
explanation.55 Fewer than five percent of plaintiffs alleging discrimination 
succeed in getting litigated relief; dismissals on the pleadings constitute almost 
ninety percent of the litigated outcomes.56 For women and minorities, bias in the 
 
52 See Robert C. Cadle, Burdens of Proof: Presumption and Pretext in Disparate 
Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 78 MASS. L. REV. 122, 122 (1993); see also 
Old W. End Ass’n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (N.D. Ohio 1987) 
(“An intent to discriminate is rarely openly expressed.”). 
53 See supra text accompanying notes 18 and 36 (explaining McDonnell Douglas analysis). 
54 Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2012) (“Indeed, even when there is 
substantial evidence of traditional invidious discriminatory intent (including so-called direct 
evidence) most people will decline to make attributions to discrimination.”). 
55 Id. at 1278, 1299 (“Collectively, then, psychology scholars have found extensive support 
for the conclusion that people are reluctant to make attributions to discrimination, even in the 
presence of compelling ‘direct’ evidence, and even when given objective measures of the 
likelihood that discrimination has occurred.”). 
56 Id. at 1276 (“Indeed, less than 5% of all discrimination plaintiffs will ever achieve any 
form of litigated relief. In contrast, dismissals (on motions to dismiss or at summary 
judgment) are extremely common in discrimination litigation, accounting for a full 86% of 
litigated outcomes.”). Professor Eyer also uses data and statistics to reject the notion that the 
failure of discrimination plaintiffs to achieve litigated successes is because the meritorious 
cases end in settlement. Id. at 1290-91; see also Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 
14-15 (citing to studies and scholars who have concluded that employment discrimination 
cases are difficult to prove, vulnerable to summary judgment rulings, and face uphill battles 
because judges and juries believe that employment discrimination has been “largely 
eradicated”); Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 317 (2015) (recognizing that borrowers have been largely 
unsuccessful in making out “reverse redlining” antidiscrimination claims for predatory 
lending in large part because “group-based or identity-based arguments are increasingly met 
with judicial opposition”). 
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assignment of liability and award of damages can further depress the likelihood 
of success or the recovery of sufficient damages.57 
The labyrinth is even more difficult to navigate for intersectional plaintiffs or 
plaintiffs experiencing intersectional discrimination.58 Some individuals 
combine the attributes of more than one protected class. Such individuals 
include, for example, a Black woman, a Latino with disabilities, and a Muslim 
from India. Antidiscrimination law’s protected class design forces such 
plaintiffs to try to separate the strands of their own identity to isolate a single 
basis for the perpetrator’s discriminatory conduct. This is an artificial, 
impossible, and arguably harmful task.59  
 
57 Studies have shown that, in both civil and criminal cases, women and minority litigants 
are less successful than men and Whites. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, 
THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) (recognizing disparities in 
success rates based on race and gender in tort cases); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social 
Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 998 (2003) ((citing DAVID C. 
BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990)) (finding that defendants in two 
thousand Georgia capital murder cases were 4.3 times more likely to receive death penalty if 
victim was White than if victim was Black)); see also Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple 
Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 991, 1019 (2011) (sharing 2011 interdisciplinary study showing that both 
plaintiffs who allege discrimination on the basis of more than one ascriptive characteristic 
and plaintiffs who are identified with more than one traditionally subordinated group find less 
success in employment discrimination cases). 
58 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing challenges for intersectional 
plaintiffs). While all individuals have intersectional identities, individuals whose identities 
straddle traditionally subjugated subclasses have struggled to attain legal remedies under 
antidiscrimination law. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Clustered Bias, 96 N.C. L. REV. 457, 
465 (2018) (“[P]laintiffs exhibiting identification with more than one traditionally 
subordinated group . . . and/or plaintiffs who allege discrimination on the basis of overlapping 
ascriptive characteristics . . . are less successful in employment discrimination actions.”). 
59 Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 
1467-68 (1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race] (“African-American women by virtue of our 
race and gender are situated within at least two systems of subordination: racism and sexism. 
This dual vulnerability does not simply mean that our burdens are doubled but instead, that 
the dynamics of racism and sexism intersect in our lives to create experiences that are 
sometimes unique to us.”). Professor Crenshaw is widely recognized as legal scholarship’s 
architect of intersectionality theory, which has explored the individual and community harm 
in requiring complex individuals to separate out and subjugate personal and group-identity 
characteristics. See Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 149-50 (“Black women’s experiences are 
much broader than the general categories that discrimination discourse provides. Yet the 
continued insistence that Black women’s demands and needs be filtered through categorical 
analyses that completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom be 
addressed.”). Intersectionality theory and post-intersectionality theory have generated a large 
and impressive body of scholarship. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 30, at 2492-98 (assessing 
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Of course, an intersectional plaintiff could allege that the discrimination she 
endured resulted from bias due to multiple identity characteristics; nothing in 
the statutory scheme prevents such a complaint. Advocates and courts, however, 
have treated multiple claims as separate and distinct legal inquiries. Siloing of 
the protected class claims proves devastating to claims of intersectional 
discrimination. Quantitative and qualitative data establish that those claims are 
more likely to fail;60 asserting multiple claims of discrimination proved to have 
an inverse relationship to success on the merits.61 
 
how Title VII doctrine has accommodated intersectional plaintiffs); Devon W. Carbado & 
Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 703 (2001) (“The 
project of this Essay is to demonstrate how identity performance theory—the area of 
discrimination in which we have done most of our work—builds on intersectionality’s insight 
that discrimination is based both on inter-group and intra-group distinctions.”); Crenshaw, 
Race, supra (discussing intersectional issues related to sexual harassment of African- 
American women); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1991) 
(“Focusing on two dimensions of male violence against women—battering and rape—I 
consider how the experiences of women of color are frequently the product of intersecting 
patterns of racism and sexism . . . .”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: 
“Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of 
Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 290 (2001) (looking to intersectionality and post-
intersectionality literature to critique the essentialist considerations underlying the Human 
Rights Campaign’s endorsement of Alfonse D’Amato in 1998); Peter Kwan, Complicity and 
Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 686-90 (2000) (further 
developing cosynthesis as theoretical model to build on intersectionality and post-
intersectionality theories); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1280-90 (1997) (developing theoretical model of cosynthesis to 
conceptualize categories of race, gender, and sexual orientation); Serena Mayeri, 
Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 715 (2015) 
(discussing how “pre-history of intersectionality” shaped Title VII). 
60 See Abrams, supra note 30 passim (detailing courts’ treatment of intersectional claims 
in civil rights suits); Mayeri, supra note 59, at 730 (documenting courts’ failure to develop 
“robust canon of intersectionality case law”). 
61 See Best et al., supra note 57, at 994-97 (explaining difficulties intersectional claimants 
face and discussing lack of empirical research on litigation outcomes); Emma Reece Denny, 
Note, Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 340 (2012) (“This Article aims to fill a hole 
in the field of intersectionality research by introducing empirical data showing that courts do 
indeed treat plaintiffs bringing multiple claims of discrimination (multiple claimants) 
significantly worse than traditional, single-claim plantiffs (single claimants).”); Minna J. 
Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1439, 1491-92 (2009) (explaining difficulties complex claimants face in attempting to prove 
pretext); Mayeri, supra note 59, at 730 (“[R]ecent studies of how claims of ‘complex bias’ 
fare in court reflect a difficult climate for plaintiffs who claim multiple or intersectional forms 
of employment discrimination.”); see also Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and 
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Finally, recent developments at the Supreme Court suggest a turn away from 
and antipathy to robust, group-based civil rights protections under federal law. 
Leading constitutional and civil rights scholars have traced a recent shift in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence away from robust substantive equal protection and 
civil rights doctrine.62 Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2007 assertion for the 
majority of the Court that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race” exemplifies this shift.63 Scholars 
have proposed different theories to explain the recent trend, including the 
Court’s adoption of post-racialism,64 anxiety about the increased pluralism in 
America,65 increased focus on social cohesion,66 or a backlash against the 
antidiscrimination movement.67 Whatever the explanation, the Court’s current 
approach to civil rights protections—constitutional and statutory—further limits 
the utility of the doctrine to remedy discrimination and exacerbates the barriers 
to success in any such legal action. 
 
Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 199, 234-35 (2006) 
(proposing amendment to Title VII that expressly includes intersectional claims). 
62 Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1143 (2002) 
(theorizing that the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence can be explained by antipathy to 
the “liberal” antidiscrimination movement and hostility to “the more ‘radical’ extensions of 
antidiscrimination law, especially those that seek to protect traditionally unprotected groups, 
extend antidiscrimination ideas to unusual contexts, or push the law beyond the principle of 
formal legal equality”); Reva B. Seigel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An 
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1286-303 (2011) 
(defining and describing “antibalkanization” perspective emerging from the Supreme Court 
in its construction of race equality cases); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (“Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied 
constitutional protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited 
Congress’s capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation. . . . These cases signal 
the end of equality doctrine as we have known it.”). 
63 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
64 Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 4 (“Increasingly, courts and the public have 
begun to embrace post-racialism, that is, the view that race discrimination is rare and race-
based protections are no longer necessary.”); Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial 
Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 387, 395 (2017) (“The Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence is decidedly postracial, in the sense that decision after decision from the Court 
rests on postracial doctrinal principles and factual premises.”). 
65 Yoshino, supra note 62, at 748 (“The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court 
reflects this pluralism anxiety. Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied 
constitutional protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited 
Congress’s capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation.”). 
66 Seigel, supra note 62, at 1300 (“[T]he Justices at the center of the Court who have cast 
the deciding votes to uphold and limit race-conscious civil rights initiatives often explain their 
position in opinions concerned with threats to social cohesion.”). 
67 Rubenfeld, supra note 62, at 1142 (theorizing that the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence is developing as backlash against the “liberal” antidiscrimination movement). 
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2. The Benefits and Risks of the Antidiscrimination Claim 
It is useful to put this in the context of Julia’s case. To succeed on a claim 
under the FHA, Julia must prove that Bill refused to rent to her, misrepresented 
the availability of an apartment, and/or otherwise made housing unavailable to 
her.68 She must also connect that bad act (or those bad acts) to her membership 
in a subclass (or subclasses) of protected class(es). 
Julia is a Black woman. In her complaint, Julia must identify the subclass or 
classes upon which she believes Bill based his decision to deny her housing. In 
other words, prior to any discovery, she must identify the “correct” protected 
class (or classes) upon which Bill based his decision to make housing 
unavailable to her.69 Then, to prove that Bill provided her false information 
about the availability or price of the apartment because of her protected class 
status, Julia will need to engage in extensive and expensive discovery. She will 
need to develop evidence that Bill lied to her about the availability and/or cost 
of the apartment and that it was because of her protected class status. To do that, 
she will need significant documentary discovery in hopes of finding notes, 
emails, or admissions to that effect. In the absence of documentary evidence, she 
will need to depose the landlord and likely several others to understand whether 
he had made statements or taken actions consistent with discriminatory leasing. 
Most likely, Julia will need to track down others who have fallen victim to Bill’s 
discriminatory actions to corroborate her testimony and establish a pattern of 
discriminatory conduct. Such an undertaking will likely be prohibitively 
expensive and time-consuming.  
Alleging discrimination may also be emotionally taxing for Julia. Because 
Julia is asserting that her damages flowed from discrimination against her 
because of her status as a Black person, a woman, or a Black woman, the 
defendant can ask questions about her identity, her prior experiences with racism 
and/or sexism, and her feelings about how race and/or sex played into this case. 
That discovery may very well be extensive and invasive, including intense and 
personal interrogatories, requests for production of documents, deposition 
questions, and cross examination. After all of that, Julia’s antidiscrimination 
 
68 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (making it unlawful to refuse to rent, misrepresent availability, 
or otherwise make unavailable a dwelling on the basis of plaintiff’s protected class 
membership). 
69 If this was an employment discrimination matter, Julia would first need to make a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See id. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (describing administrative exhaustion requirements). She could also choose to fill out 
a similar form and file a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”). See id. § 3610 (providing optional administrative adjudicative process). To do that, 
Julia would need to fill out a form, where she must check a box (or more than one box) 
asserting her relevant protected class(es). For a deeper understanding of how those forms 
constrain plaintiffs in antidiscrimination actions, see Elengold, supra note 58, at 472-74. 
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claim is still likely to fail, for all of the empirical and analytical reasons stated 
above. 
That is not to say, however, that there are no doctrinal benefits for Julia in 
pursuing her claim under antidiscrimination laws. There are, in fact, several 
reasons why it makes sense for Julia to assert her claims under the FHA and/or 
the North Carolina State Fair Housing Act. First, there is a benefit to telling a 
standard story about a woman or a Black person who is the victim of housing 
discrimination. Such a narrative, sometimes known as a “stock story,” draws on 
assumed social order in our communities and world.70 In so doing, it resonates 
with judges and juries because it feels consistent with what they know and 
understand about how the world works, and thus seems credible.71 Second, the 
antidiscrimination statutes provide comprehensive and significant remedies. If 
she prevails, Julia can seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, 
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees.72 Julia could recover monetary damages 
for actual, compensatory, and punitive damages. Her actual damages might, for 
example, include the additional amount she had to pay to rent an alternate unit, 
an amount representing time lost at work due to her interactions with Bill 
Herman, or an amount reflecting lost opportunity if she was forced into an 
apartment farther away from work or viable public transportation. She could also 
be compensated for the emotional distress she suffered. In addition to actual, 
economic, or out-of-pocket costs, courts have held that successful discrimination 
 
70 See Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
117, 122 (2002) (describing persuasive storytelling as that which “resonate[s] with the values, 
beliefs and assumptions of our audience,” including such stock stories as “the heroic 
firefighter, the Good Samaritan” and “pernicious stories” such as “the helpless woman victim, 
the crack whore, the lascivious f*g”). 
71 See DAVID F. CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOL 
CLINICAL PROGRAMS 49 (2d ed. 2002) (emphasizing importance of credibility in developing 
case theory). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (providing that “[i]n a civil action . . . if the court finds that a 
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may award to the 
plaintiff actual and punitive damages,” along with “any permanent or temporary injunction, 
temporary restraining order, or other order” and “a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs”). The 
same is true for other civil rights statutes. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1982) (“We 
hold that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when 
the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves 
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”); Probe v. State 
Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 1986) (awarding attorneys’ fees under Title 
VII); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 533-39 (1999) (clarifying reckless 
indifference standard for punitive damages under Title VII). Although not specifically related 
to Julia’s individual relief, if Julia prevails, there is a broad social and professional cost to Bill 
Herman to be labeled a “racist.” It is worth considering whether such an outcome might 
achieve one or more of Julia’s goals, including warning others of Bill’s malevolent intent. 
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plaintiffs can recover for the “embarrassment and humiliation they suffered” due 
to the discriminatory acts.73 Such awards have been significant.74 
Third, the FHA’s statutory scheme offers varied avenues for Julia to seek 
legal redress. Julia could file a fair housing complaint with the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or the North Carolina Human 
Relations Commission. The FHA’s statutory scheme affords Julia an 
opportunity to file such a complaint at no initial cost to her.75 After government 
investigators assess the merits of the complaint, the statutory scheme affords 
Julia an opportunity to conciliate or litigate her case in an administrative court.76 
She may also elect to have her case heard in federal court, whereafter she could 
be named an aggrieved person in a suit against the defendant brought by the 
United States, through which the federal government could seek damages on her 
behalf.77 Julia, however, is not obligated to go through the administrative 
process. Because the FHA does not have an administrative exhaustion 
requirement, Julia could also choose to file her complaint directly in state or 
federal court.78 
3. The Flexibility of Consumer Protection’s Design and Doctrine 
Consumer protection law requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
engaged in a practice related to a consumer transaction that was unfair, 
deceptive, fraudulent, or that otherwise caused injury to the plaintiff. In many 
states, the doctrine has developed in a way that has enhanced a plaintiff’s ability 
to remedy a wide range of problematic consumer transactions.79 
 
73 Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (directing lower court to 
“award plaintiffs an amount which will fairly compensate them for [their] emotional distress,” 
including “embarrassment and humiliation they suffered”); see also Littlefield v. McGuffey, 
954 F.2d 1337, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming jury award of fifty thousand dollars in 
compensatory damages and one hundred thousand dollars in punitive damages for race-based 
discrimination); Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908 
F.2d 864, 872-73 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing relationship between “humiliation and 
embarrassment” plaintiffs suffered and damages awarded). 
74 See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 25:6 
(2017). 
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 3610. 
76 See id. 
77 Id. § 3614(b). This option would limit Julia’s financial costs for pursuing a claim under 
the FHA. It does not, however, necessarily limit the emotional costs. And, unless Julia 
intervenes as a plaintiff (and takes on the financial burden of litigating the case), under this 
option, Julia loses control of the strategy and resolution of the case. 
78 Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A). 
79 There is no private right of action under the FTCA. Therefore, individual plaintiffs often 
turn to state UDAP and other consumer protection laws to vindicate their rights. Because state 
laws vary, it is not accurate to say that the doctrine has universally developed to enhance a 
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Like all states, North Carolina has a UDAP statute,80 patterned from the 
FTCA.81 When Congress passed the FTCA in 1914, the Act aimed to prevent 
monopolies.82 Then, in 1938, Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Act to amend 
the FTCA to cover a broader range of abusive practices, prohibiting “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices . . . .”83 In his congressional testimony prior to the 
passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, then FTC Commissioner Ewin L. 
Davis explained that the purpose of the amendment is: 
[T]o protect the public against acts and practices injurious to the public 
where no competition or injury to competitors may exist, or where 
competition or injury to competitors is so obvious that the Government 
should not be put to the time and expense of proving competition and injury 
to competitors, or where competitors may not be entitled to protection 
because of the same fraudulent character of their business.84  
By the 1960s, however, critics claimed that the FTC was largely ineffective in 
remedying fraud and abuse against consumers.85 The FTCA’s failure to provide 
a private right of action further limited the FTC’s ability to achieve remedies for 
individuals.86 In response to the consumer protection movement of the 1960s,87 
 
plaintiff’s ability to achieve a legal remedy. See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text 
(describing recovery under different state UDAP statutes). 
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2018) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practice in or affecting commerce, are declared 
unlawful.”). 
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012). 
82 See Megan Bittakis, Consumer Protection Laws: Not Just for Consumers, 13 WYO. L. 
REV. 439, 442 (2013) (noting FTC’s original focus on antitrust). 
83 Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45); see also Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 440 (1991) (charting 
evolution of FTCA). 
84 To Amend the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings on S.3744 Before the S. Comm. 
on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong. 19 (1936) (statement of Ewin L. Davis, Member, FTC); 
see also Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little FTC 
Act”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990) (noting the 
Wheeler-Lea Act’s legislative history “evidence[s] a clear intent that the Commission 
vigorously pursue questionable trade practices that adversely affected consumers, regardless 
of any resultant impact on competitive business”). 
85 Sovern, supra note 83, at 442 (noting that the FTC was “harshly criticized as ineffective” 
by legal community in 1960s). 
86 Stephanie L. Kroeze, Note, The FTC Won’t Let Me Be: A Need for a Private Right of 
Action Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 227, 231-40 (2015) (outlining 
elements of federal consumer protection laws). 
87 Scholars have defined the consumer protection advocacy of the 1960s as a social 
movement. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the 
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and the Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. 
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the FTC encouraged states to adopt their own consumer protection statutes to 
mimic the FTCA’s protections.88 In 1964, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws developed a model consumer protection 
law as guidance for state legislatures.89 State legislatures responded, passing 
statutes largely based on the FTCA that became known as “‘UDAP’ statutes, for 
‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices,’”90 or “Little FTC Acts.”91 By affording 
individual consumers a private right of action, UDAP statutes filled a significant 
gap in the consumer protection doctrine.92 By 1981, every state and the District 
of Columbia had passed a UDAP or Little FTC Act, varying in scope, remedy, 
and breadth.93 Although the North Carolina law, for instance, includes a blanket 
 
REV. 1147, 1183 (2010) (arguing that modern consumer movement of 1960s and 1970s fits 
within definition of a social movement, which includes: (1) sustained organizational effort to 
effect social change, (2) consumer lawyers acting as resources, and (3) multi-prong strategy 
that included law reform); Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions 
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade 
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 526-31 (1980) (describing 
“consumer movement” in 1960s and 1970s). In fact, for some, the 1960s “might well go down 
in history as the decade in which the consumers of America rose up to protect their interests 
and managed to obtain some response from government.” DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN 
TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 4 (1974). The movement was marked by 
increased activism by the FTC and passage of federal statutory consumer protections like the 
Consumer Protection Act, which included the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). Id. (describing 
Congress’s response to consumer activism); Budnitz, supra, at 1149 (pointing to TILA as 
critical marker of modern consumer movement, especially because it was the first federal law 
“regulating the consumer financial services industry that provided consumers with a private 
right of action”). 
88 Bittakis, supra note 82, at 443 (detailing efforts to encourage states to adopt analogous 
laws); Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 87, at 522 (“The Commission strongly encouraged these 
state-level activities, recognizing that enforcement of the Act’s broad section 5 proscription 
against ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ could not possibly be accomplished without 
extra-agency assistance.”). 
89 Bittakis, supra note 82, at 443 (observing that model law ultimately proved “insufficient 
to protect individual consumers”). In a 1970 amendment, the Council of State Governments, 
in consultation with the FTC, followed up that guidance with three variations, all in an effort 
to provide choices to states to craft a better fit for their needs. Id.  
90 SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 97. 
91 Id.; see also Sovern, supra note 83, at 446-52 (discussing details of “Little FTC Acts”). 
92 Although the UDAP statutes originally limited enforcement authority to state agencies, 
states passed or amended many to include a private right of action. See Sovern, supra note 83, 
at 446. 
93 Id.; see also Karns, supra note 84, at 388-429 (detailing various state Little FTC Acts 
and their relationship to FTC’s guidance). 
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exception for learned professions,94 it is otherwise a good example of a standard 
state UDAP law.95 It states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, 
are declared unlawful.”96  
State UDAP statutes provide certain protections against unfair and deceptive 
practices in the consumer context. The great majority provide a private right of 
action, coupled with some combination of statutory damages, compensatory 
damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees provisions.97 Those protections, in 
combination, have generally been considered successful at providing consumers 
a means of vindicating their rights. Professor Dee Pridgen notes that there are 
some detractors of UDAP statutes, but, for the most part: 
Over the years since their inception, the state UDAP statutes, with their 
private rights of action, have been instrumental in achieving justice for 
consumers. The litigated cases have been numerous, numbering in the 
thousands each year, with some states such as Texas, Washington, 
Massachusetts, and California, being particularly active. . . . In numerous 
cases individual consumers have been able, thanks to the state UDAP 
statutes, to gain legal representation, go to court, and be compensated for 
their injury, all the while providing legal precedents and strong remedies 
that are hoped to deter similar violations.98 
UDAP statutes are widely considered the “bedrock protections” for 
consumers against “predators and unscrupulous businesses,” and, 
unsurprisingly, their effectiveness varies across states.99  
The design of the consumer protection doctrine is both relatively inclusive 
and flexible. Unlike the protected class orientation of the antidiscrimination 
doctrine, the consumer protection doctrine focuses specifically and uniquely on 
the defendant’s bad act(s). Like the FTCA,100 the great majority of UDAP 
 
94 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2018) (“For purposes of this section, ‘commerce’ includes 
all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services 
rendered by a member of a learned profession.”). 
95 See Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (N.C. 1981) (recognizing that language of 
North Carolina UDAP law tracks relevant section of FTCA, but adds private right of action). 
96 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a). 
97 See Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Evaluation of 
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Laws, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 1, 9 (Mar. 2018), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/98TM-K5QG]. 
98 Pridgen, supra note 9, at 290; see also Pridgen, supra note 20, at 911 (“The state UDAP 
laws were initially somewhat slow to be invoked, but their enforcement has now reached a 
level of maturity and strength that is quite impressive.”). 
99 Carter, supra note 97, at 9. 
100 In the FTCA, Congress explicitly chose to avoid defining or detailing what would 
constitute “unfair or deceptive” practices, leaving it up to the FTC to develop guidance. S. 
REP. NO. 597, at 13 (1914) (“The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to 
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statutes include broad, general prohibitions against unfair and deceptive acts.101 
State courts look to federal guidance to define “unfair” and “deceptive.” The 
2010 Dodd-Frank legislation, for example, set forth a test for establishing 
“unfair” practices, defining such to require: “(1) substantial consumer injury 
(which can be by small injury to many consumers), (2) that is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers, and (3) that is not outweighed by benefits to consumers 
and competition.”102 Federal law traditionally defined the term “deceptive” to 
require: “(1) a trade practice deemed to have a tendency or capacity to deceive; 
(2) the potential to deceive a member or members of the audience targeted by 
the trade practice; and (3) a requirement that the practice be material with respect 
to a consumer’s purchase decision.”103 In 1981, the FTC issued a Deception 
Policy Statement, which, while criticized,104 has universally reshaped the 
 
whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in 
commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would, by a general declaration 
condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices were 
unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the better, for the reason, as stated by one 
of the representatives of the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association, that there were too many 
unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be quite possible 
to invent others.”); H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (“It is impossible to frame 
definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in 
this field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would 
be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, 
it would undertake an endless task. It is also practically impossible to define unfair practices 
so that the definition will fit business of every sort in every part of this country.”); Bittakis, 
supra note 82, at 442 (“Rather than trying to describe every possible unfair and deceptive 
trade practice, Congress left the power of determining what constitutes such trade practices 
to the FTC.”). 
101 Carter, supra note 97, at 12-14 (identifying forty-five states and District of Columbia 
with statutes that include broad substantive protections against deceptive practices and thirty-
nine states and District of Columbia with broad protections against unfair practices). 
102 Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 125 (2012) (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1031(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012)). 
The FTC also issued a similar 1980 Unfairness Statement, which stated: “To justify a finding 
of unfairness the [consumer] injury must satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not 
be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice 
produces; and it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have 
avoided.” Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product 
Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and Other Consumer 
Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 282-83 (2000) (quoting FTC STATEMENT OF POLICY ON 
CONSUMER UNFAIRNESS JURISDICTION (1980), reprinted in Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 
app. (1984)). 
103 Karns, supra note 84, at 381 (footnotes omitted). 
104 See id. at 386 (“Congress rejected the report as biased and non-neutral.”). 
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definition of deception.105 Based on that statement, the FTC defines “an act or 
practice deceptive if, first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, 
second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 
circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is 
material.”106 Most state UDAP statutes provide a private right of action for 
individuals victimized by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in a consumer 
transaction.107 Because the focus of a consumer protection claim is the 
defendant’s bad act(s) wholly unconnected to the plaintiff’s identity or 
membership in a particular group, the design of the consumer protection statutes 
is more inclusive and flexible than that of the antidiscrimination statutes. 
4. The Benefits and Risks of the Consumer Protection Claim 
Now return to Julia’s case. To make a claim under North Carolina’s UDAP 
statute, Julia would need to show that Bill engaged in an unfair or deceptive act 
or practice that affected commerce and proximately caused Julia’s injury.108 In 
contrast to Julia’s discrimination claim, the UDAP statute affords Julia several 
benefits.109 
The first benefit is Julia’s likelihood of success on the claim. State UDAP 
statutes can protect against discriminatory actions like those Julia faced.110 In 
 
105 See id. at 388-89 (detailing deference given to policy statement). 
106 Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984); see also Braucher, supra note 102, at 
125 (detailing influence of FTC Statement on Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). 
107 Carter, supra note 97, at 53-65 (cataloging and assessing private rights of action under 
state UDAP statutes). 
108 Melton v. Family First Mortg. Corp., 576 S.E.2d 365, 368 (N.C. Ct. App.), aff’d, 597 
S.E.2d 672 (N.C. 2003) (mem.) (“The necessary elements for a claim under [N.C. GEN. STAT.] 
§ 75-1.1 are: ‘(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, which 
(3) proximately caused actual injury to the claimnant.’” (citing Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. 
Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002))). This is consistent with other state UDAP 
laws. See, e.g., Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002) 
(construing Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 505/1 to /12 to require: “(1) a deceptive or unfair act or practice by the defendant; (2) 
the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception; and (3) the occurrence of the 
deception during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce”). 
109 At the most basic level, state UDAP statutes have a broader scope than 
antidiscrimination statutes. Deanne Loonin, Race Discrimination and Consumer Law: What 
Legal Services Can Do to Attain Justice in the Marketplace, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 47, 50 
(2002) (noting strengths of UDAP statutes for challenging discrimination). 
110 See, e.g., Sager v. Hous. Comm’n, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 568 (D. Md. 2012) (allowing 
plaintiff’s claim under Maryland Consumer Protection Act to proceed based on allegations 
that defendant housing authority induced plaintiff to sign “vacate agreement” for her 
subsidized housing); Anast v. Commonwealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792, 802 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
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fact, Julia can point to two separate acts that likely violated the UDAP statute. 
First, Bill misrepresented the availability of the two-bedroom apartment to Julia, 
a potential consumer. Second, Bill quoted Julia a price that was too high for the 
alternate one-bedroom apartment.111 Julia prevails if she can prove that either 
one or both of those acts were either unfair or deceptive. There is a good 
argument that both acts are unfair and deceptive under the definitions set forth 
above.112 The misrepresentations were unfair because Bill used information 
available only to him, to which Julia could not be privy, in order to deny her 
access to housing.113 And misrepresentations or omissions of material facts are 
sufficient to prove deception.114 In fact, false advertising—promising a 
consumer a product or price and then failing to deliver on that promise—is one 
of the most recognized forms of unfair or deceptive practices.115  
 
Business Practices Act claim based on plaintiff’s allegations that defendant evicted her from 
apartment in violation of lease requirements). 
111 This is clear because he quoted Julia a higher price for the one-bedroom ($800) than 
had been advertised for the two-bedroom ($750) and than he quoted to George ($650). 
112 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (detailing what constitutes unfairness 
or deceptive practices and acts). 
113 See Supplee v. Miller-Motte Bus. Coll., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 582, 598 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) 
(noting “party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in conduct which amounts 
to an inequitable assertion of its power of privilege” (quoting McInerney v. Pinehurst Area 
Realty, Inc., 590 S.E.2d 313, 316-17 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004))). 
114 There are potential factual anomalies here that could make Bill’s statements true or 
otherwise not misrepresentations. But if they are misrepresentations, Julia would not need to 
show improper motivation connected to her protected class; she would need only prove 
misrepresentation to satisfy that prong of the UDAP claim. See Krebs v. Charlotte Sch. of 
Law, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00190, 2017 WL 3880667, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 2017) 
(declining to dismiss class plaintiffs’ UDAP claim against defendant based on 
misrepresentations made about school’s accreditation and other misleading information to 
students, and recognizing that “North Carolina courts have traditionally applied this statute 
liberally, including claims involving negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose 
material information”); Kron Med. Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assocs., Inc., 420 S.E.2d 192, 
196 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding failure to disclose information tantamount to 
misrepresentation and thus unfair or deceptive practice in violation of North Carolina’s 
UDAP); Haigh v. Superior Ins. Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-02582, 2017 WL 4848154, at *4 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2017) (holding plaintiffs adequately pleaded North Carolina UDAP 
claim based on defendant’s failure to disclose hidden commissions). North Carolina courts 
have found “sufficient aggravating circumstances” in cases involving “forgery or deception.” 
Chapel H.O.M. Assocs., LLC v. RME Mgmt., LLC, 808 S.E.2d 576, 579 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2017) (collecting cases). If Bill’s statements were not misrepresentations, Julia may not have 
a successful UDAP case. The purpose of this exercise is not, however, to litigate Julia’s claim. 
Rather, it is to set forth a factual scenario that allows courts, practitioners, and scholars to 
consider the benefits or detriments of one claim compared to the other. 
115 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer 
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“The inadequacy of common law tools with 
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Of course, Bill could defend against Julia’s UDAP and FHA claims by 
proving that his statements were not, in fact, misrepresentations. Julia must 
establish the elements of either the antidiscrimination or consumer protection 
claim. The difference between proving the two claims is that the 
antidiscrimination claim requires an extra step—proving that Bill made the 
misrepresentation because of Julia’s membership in a protected class and 
subclass. The consumer protection claim requires only that Julia prove the 
misrepresentation itself. At the most basic level, the antidiscrimination claim 
requires an additional element. To prove a discrimination claim, Julia must 
prove A (misrepresentation) + B (intent); to prove a consumer protection claim, 
Julia must only prove A (misrepresentation).116 State UDAP statutes, patterned 
from the FTCA, “eliminated the need to prove intent to deceive, and justifiable 
reliance.”117 Because Julia needs only prove Bill’s bad actions, she is 
unburdened by the demands of proof and persuasion that accompany the added 
element of intent.118 This is particularly salient for Julia because her identity as 
a Black woman would complicate her effort to attain a remedy under 
antidiscrimination law, but not under consumer protection law. 
In addition to establishing that the act was unfair or deceptive, Julia must 
show that she was injured by the misrepresentation(s). Julia has strong 
arguments that she was so injured.119 Julia could argue that she lost time 
responding to the advertisement stating that a two-bedroom was available. She 
may have given up an opportunity at another apartment or lost hours at work. 
She may have had costs associated with transportation. She may be forced to 
pay more somewhere else because she missed the beginning of the month or a 
special deal. She may be forced to either pay more for a smaller apartment, 
causing financial and emotional stress, or move to a different area, perhaps one 
without access to a grocery store or quality public transportation. 
The second benefit of Julia’s UDAP claim is the possibility of recovering 
significant money damages based on those injuries. State UDAP statutes 
generally give consumers a private right of action to seek compensatory 
damages, an injunction against the fraudulent practices, and, in most states, 
 
which a consumer could address false advertising and deceitful commercial schemes in some 
circumstances eventually led Congress in 1914 to establish the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and empower it to regulate such conduct.”). 
116 Compare Clarke, supra note 42, at 109-41 (discussing how courts interpret elements of 
antidiscrimination statutes), with Melton v. Family First Mortg. Corp., 576 S.E.2d 365, 368 
(N.C. Ct. App.), aff’d, 597 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. 2003) (mem.) (listing elements of consumer 
protection claim under North Carolina UDAP statute). 
117 Pridgen, supra note 20, at 918. 
118 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing proof issues in intentional 
discrimination claims). 
119 See supra Section I.B.2 (assessing Julia’s claims). 
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attorneys’ fees.120 While some state statutes limit recovery to unfair or deceptive 
practices that negatively affect the community at large,121 all state statutes permit 
compensatory relief,122 and twenty-five state statutes permit consumers to 
recover double and treble damages.123 Seven states that do not authorize multiple 
damages do authorize punitive damages for UDAP violations.124 Although the 
ability to recover for emotional distress damages in antidiscrimination cases is a 
clear advantage, some UDAP statutes also permit recovery for mental anguish, 
physical pain and suffering, or consequential damages.125 In Delaware, for 
example, a plaintiff was able to recover consequential damages in the amount of 
lost profits from the nursing home he had planned to operate on purchased real 
estate where the defendant omitted that the property was subject to imminent 
foreclosure.126 In North Carolina, if successful on her UDAP claim, Julia would 
be entitled to treble damages for her injuries and may be eligible to recover 
attorneys’ fees.127 She may also be able to recover for emotional distress 
damages.128 Depending on how well Julia connected the loss of this apartment 
to greater opportunity and employment, her damages may be extensive. 
Third, litigating a UDAP claim in state court would be less expensive and less 
emotionally taxing than litigating an antidiscrimination claim in federal court. A 
state claim would more quickly move through the court system, offering Julia a 
more efficient means of exercising her rights. Because she need only prove that 
Bill lied to her, a fact that she could establish through her own testimony and 
 
120 Carter, supra note 97, at 35 (noting only five state UDAP statutes—Arizona, Delaware, 
Mississippi, South Dakota, and Wymoing—lack attorneys’ fees provision). 
121 Id. at 39 (noting Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina, 
and Washington UDAP statutes impose community impact limitation). 
122 Id. at 33. 
123 Id. at 42-43. 
124 Id. at 44 (listing California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Oregon, and 
Rhode Island). 
125 Michael C. Bruck, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection: 
Damages in UDAP Claims 23, 28 (July 25-Aug. 1, 2015) (unpublished presentation) (on file 
with author) (“A plaintiff’s allegations of aggravation, inconvenience, mental anguish, and 
emotional distress suffered as a result of Defendant’s conduct are sufficient to plead 
damages.”). 
126 Nash v. Hoopes, 332 A.2d 411, 414 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (calculating damages). 
127 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2018). The North Carolina statute requires treble damages 
in successful suits. Id. (“[I]f damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.” 
(emphasis added)). Attorneys’ fees are awarded in North Carolina at the judge’s discretion 
and only upon a finding that the charged party “willfully engaged” in the prohibited activity. 
Id. § 75-16.1. 
128 Williams v. HomEq Servicing Corp., 646 S.E.2d 381, 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(recognizing that emotional distress damages are available under chapter 75 of North Carolina 
code). 
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testimony from George Simon, Julia may be able to avoid time-consuming and 
expensive discovery. And because she would not need to plead and prove her 
identity, Bill’s intent to discriminate because of her identity, or emotional 
distress connected to the intentional discrimination,129 Julia may be spared 
painful and invasive discovery. Finally, it is possible that, by choosing not to 
assert discrimination, Julia may escape the bias and unfair treatment that many 
discrimination plaintiffs face from judges and juries. To be sure, data suggests 
that women and people of color face discrimination in judgments whether or not 
they explicitly allege gender or race discrimination.130 Telling a universal story 
that could happen to any consumer, however, may offer a point of connection 
between Julia and the factfinder, interrupting the factfinder’s implicit or explicit 
biases.131 
Unsurprisingly, Julia’s UDAP claim also comes with risks and drawbacks. To 
begin, there are process concerns. State courts operate more informally and with 
less process than federal courts.132 In fact, state courts around the country have 
been criticized for failing to consistently apply rules of civil procedure and for 
pushing parties to settle.133 State court juries also tend to award lower judgments 
than federal court juries.134 State court claims allow for less, or less formal, 
discovery, and have more pro se litigants.135 Although those considerations are 
 
129 Of course, if Julia seeks emotional distress damages or seeks to connect Bill’s bad acts 
to racist or other bias-oriented motivations, she will open herself up to some of the same 
downsides that accompany a discrimination claim. She will not, however, have to prove intent 
or motivation to prevail on her UDAP claim. 
130 See sources cited supra note 57 (detailing judge and jury bias in gender and race 
discrimination cases). 
131 Such an approach is not without concern. Part III takes up that analysis more fully. 
132 See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under 
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 395 (1992) (identifying 
four “main rationales at work in forum selection”: (1) fears about state court’s biases or 
competence, (2) concern about pace and/or cost of litigating the action, (3) use of procedure 
to browbeat opponent into settlement or gain some other tactical advantage, and (4) 
convenience for the attorney). Professor Miller’s study shows different assessments of costs 
and benefits for state and federal court practice depending on whether the attorney was a 
defense- or plaintiff-side attorney. Id. at 400. 
133 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and 
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1872 (2008) (detailing 
how advocates for the Class Action Fairness Act described state courts as “less careful”  and 
as “‘lax’ tribunals that applied the rules of law ‘inconsistently’” than federal courts (footnotes 
omitted)); cf. Sovern, supra note 83, at 458 (identifying small claims court venue as drawback 
to UDAP claim due to lack of uniform commitment to integrity of federal and state courts). 
134 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A 
Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 434 (1996) (finding, in part, that jury “award 
levels are much higher in federal court than in state court”). 
135 See, e.g., Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The 
Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving 
  
2019] CONSUMER REMEDIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 619 
 
not per se negative, they do increase uncertainty and risk associated with 
litigation. 
There are also normative concerns. Pursuing a UDAP claim places Julia’s 
injury in the realm of a negative consumer transaction. It does not offer Julia an 
opportunity to connect her injury to historic and systemic discrimination against 
Blacks, women, or Black women in America. This Article takes up that 
normative analysis in Part III, below. 
Finally, there are doctrinal concerns that extend beyond Julia’s individual 
story. Specifically, there are concerns that the patchwork state laws are or will 
become ineffectual to achieve remedies for plaintiffs like Julia. A micro analysis 
suggests risks to relying on consumer protection to remedy certain civil rights 
violations. State UDAP statutes vary and some have fewer protections than 
others. For example, state courts in Michigan and Rhode Island have interpreted 
their state UDAP provisions very narrowly, leaving fewer covered 
transactions.136 State UDAP statutes in Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming prohibit successful plaintiffs from recovering attorneys’ 
fees, making it financially challenging for consumers to take advantage of the 
protections.137 And in Alaska, the UDAP statute requires unsuccessful 
consumers to pay attorneys’ fees to the business they sued.138 Patchwork state 
UDAP statutes lead to unequal treatment for individual victims of consumer 
protection violations across states and confused messaging to goods and service 
providers about what is acceptable and unacceptable consumer-related practice. 
A macro analysis also highlights the risk of turning to consumer protection to 
remedy certain civil rights violations. Historically, as set forth below, lawmakers 
and the courts have narrowed civil rights protections generally and with respect 
 
Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 187 (2012) (recognizing that 
“[t]he pro se phenomenon had the harshest effect on courts hearing family law matters,” which 
take place in state courts). 
136 See Smith v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 597 N.W.2d 28, 38 (Mich. 1999) (exempting any 
business activity already subject to regulation from the Michigan Consumer Protection Act); 
Carter, supra note 97, at 1 (“UDAP protections in Michigan and Rhode Island—the ‘terrible 
two’—have been gutted by court decisions that interpret the statute as being applicable to 
almost no consumer transactions. These decisions were issued over ten years ago, yet the state 
legislatures still have not corrected them.”). 
137 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(a) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(1) (2018) 
(allowing attorneys’ fees for defendants but not plaintiffs); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31 
(2018) (“Any person who claims to have been adversely affected by any act or a practice 
declared to be unlawful . . . shall be permitted to bring a civil action for the recovery of actual 
damages suffered as a result . . . .”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (2017) (authorizing 
attorneys’ fees only for class actions); Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 521 
P.2d 1119, 1123 (Ariz. 1974) (finding no right to recover attorneys’ fees under Arizona UDAP 
statute). 
138 ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537(c) (2017) (“[I]f the plaintiff is not the prevailing 
party . . . the court shall award a prevailing defendant . . . full reasonable attorney fees.”). 
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to economic justice specifically.139 There is a risk that, by using consumer 
protection to achieve antidiscrimination or race-based goals, politicians and 
judges will similarly narrow consumer protection law’s flexibility and reach. It 
is only because of the narrow and rigid interpretation of civil rights statutes—
law specifically designed to address group-based discrimination—that this 
Article and its analysis becomes necessary and important. It is conceivable that 
the same fate would befall the consumer protection doctrine.140 
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Before exploring the normative trade-offs inherent in choosing consumer 
protection or antidiscrimination law to remedy traditional civil rights violations, 
this Part briefly sets out the historical development of the current 
antidiscrimination doctrine.141 It does so to provide context for the normative 
analysis. One must wrestle with two observations to engage fully in the 
normative discussion. First, that historically, civil rights advocates understood 
economic citizenship as a core component of robust civil rights protections. And 
second, that antidiscrimination law has developed narrowly, severing the 
relationship between economic rights and civil rights, and otherwise 
constraining the ability of those laws to achieve anti-subordination and group-
based equality goals. This Article argues that these observations lead to dual 
conclusions. First, that by ignoring the import of economic citizenship and 
narrowly constraining its protections, civil rights laws designed to remedy and 
prevent race-based and other group-based discrimination have betrayed at least 
part of their original aims. And second, that because economic citizenship is 
inextricable from political and social citizenship, promoting full and fair access 
to consumer systems will advance the group-based equality goals of historic 
civil rights movements. 
A. The Relationship Between Economic Citizenship and Civil Rights 
Throughout American history, civil rights movements and advocacy have 
promoted economic citizenship as a key component of civil rights. In the wake 
of the Civil War and the Reconstruction period, advocates pushed for land grants 
and a robust Freedman’s Bureau to support economic citizenship for recently-
 
139 See infra Section II.B (discussing civil rights history). 
140 In fact, due in part to the strength and flexibility of the UDAP statutes, they have 
recently been subject to criticism and challenges. See Pridgen, supra note 20, at 937-41 
(detailing and rebutting varied critiques of state UDAP laws and their robust enforcement). 
141 This Article merely skims the surface of a rich and complex history, borrowing from 
historians and legal historians who have contributed immensely to the scholarly literature. For 
a more complete picture of the development of civil rights and antidiscrimination law, see 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014); 
TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011). 
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freed Blacks.142 As far back as 1865, the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment 
sought not just to abolish slavery, but to promote a broader understanding of 
economic citizenship.143 They envisioned “free labor” as “not just the absence 
of slavery and its vestiges,” but also “the guarantee of an affirmative state of 
labor autonomy,” which were delineated by “specific freedoms that were the 
inalienable prerogatives of the working man.”144 In fact, in the 1940s and 1950s, 
civil rights lawyers at the U.S. Department of Justice turned to the Thirteenth 
Amendment to seek legal redress for various kinds of legal and economic 
coercion.145 
The New Deal civil rights movement, developed and led by industrial labor 
unions, also recognized the relationship between social and economic 
citizenship.146 Advocates fought for the right to work, the right to a livelihood, 
and the right to social insurance, connecting those measures of economic 
independence to full democratic participation.147 
The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s similarly recognized the 
import of economic justice in the fight for civil rights. Although the popular 
conception of that movement is a fight for formal equality,148 a deeper study of 
the civil rights movement reveals that many civil rights advocates and activists 
shared a deep and abiding belief that economic access, economic justice, and 
 
142 MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH 
GAP 17-23 (2017). 
143 The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and prohibited involuntary servitude. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
144 Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 305, 308 (1988); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438-39 (1989) (citing E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, 
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11 (1970)). 
145 Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1614 (2001) (“In the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, Civil Rights 
Section lawyers came to use the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for instituting ‘free 
labor,’ broadly defined, and for prohibiting various kinds of legal and economic coercion.”). 
146 Forbath, supra note 10, at 697 (tracing historical development of union-based New 
Deal civil rights movement and connecting it to church-based civil rights movement of 
1960s). 
147 Id. at 698 (“Along with the right to work and a right to livelihood went a right to social 
insurance and a right to a measure of economic independence and democracy.”). 
148 See Brown-Nagin, supra note 10, at 2700-01 (arguing that Professor Ackerman’s 
influential volume “privileges the formal lawmaking process and popular consensus” and fails 
to honor “formal and informal influences on lawmaking, moments of consensus and contest, 
and federally ratified and locally sanctioned dimensions of the socio-legal agenda established 
during the civil rights era” (citing ACKERMAN, supra note 141, at 3-4, 5-7)). 
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economic citizenship are critical to the fight for civil rights.149 Movement 
leaders, including Ella Baker, A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, and the 
leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”), pushed 
for universal economic citizenship to sit at the forefront of the movement’s 
platform.150 They sought income guarantees, significant government investment 
in poor communities, and a right to housing.151 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
recognized that the “inseparable twin of racial injustice was economic 
injustice”152 and joined the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 
Chicago to lead housing marches, end slums, increase the minimum wage, and 
eradicate mortgage and loan discrimination.153 From Dr. King’s choice to frame 
his famous “I Have a Dream” speech around the metaphor of a bank default154 
 
149 It has been suggested, in fact, that the fight against Jim Crow segregation was 
complementary, but secondary, to the fight for economic citizenship. Brown-Nagin, supra 
note 10, at 2714-15 (“From the bottom up, the labor roots of the movement and the struggle 
for economic equality are clear. The struggle against Jim Crow laws unrelated to economic 
rights is important but not dominant.”). Economic citizenship is not, of course, the only facet 
of the civil rights movement that has faded from the national narrative. The role of Black 
feminists, for example, has also been lost in the dominant narrative of the civil rights 
movement. See, e.g., Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political 
Uses of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1252 (2005) (“[V]irtually nothing in the dominant 
narrative would lead us to expect an image of the [1963 March on Washington] that showed 
women carrying signs demanding jobs for all, decent housing, fair pay, and equal rights 
‘NOW!’, thus asserting both their racial solidarity and their identities as activists and workers 
and thereby equals of men.”). 
150 Brown-Nagin, supra note 10, at 2711 (“[Advocates in the civil rights movement] 
pushed Dr. King and lawmakers to pursue a progressive agenda of economic citizenship for 
all more quickly.”). 
151 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 3-4 (discussing how activists believed racial and economic 
justice were “indissoluble”). 
152 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM, THE MONTGOMERY STORY 69 
(1958). 
153 50 Years Ago: MLK Jr.’s Speech at Soldier Field, March to City Hall with Demands 
for Daley, CHI. TRIBUNE (July 10, 2016, 4:19 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-
martin-luther-king-jr-1966-speech-chicago-20160706-story.html [https://perma.cc/L5XJ-
NQLZ] (“The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, then led by King, targeted Chicago 
‘due to high levels of institutionalized discrimination’ in schools and housing. Mortgage and 
loan discrimination, tenants rights, quality education and job access were among the goals.”); 
Linda Lutton, Fifty Years Ago Today, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Got a Chicago Address, 
WBEZ NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/fifty-years-ago-
today-dr-martin-luther-king-jr-gets-a-chicago-address/b9534b2d-cc7f-4e34-ab59-
c024cbd5aa3b [https://perma.cc/57U2-SVEK] (“The dream King talked about in Chicago 
included a 60 percent increase to the minimum wage.”). 
154 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington 
D.C. 1-2 (Aug. 28, 1963), https://www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2H5-MAUN] (calling out America for “default[ing] on this promissory 
  
2019] CONSUMER REMEDIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 623 
 
to his call for full, fair, and equal access to credit and consumer markets at his 
speech at Soldier Field,155 the connection between economic justice and racial 
justice can be traced throughout the civil rights movement. 
In fact, consumer spaces were the nerve center and consumption tool of the 
movement’s non-violent protest.156 Blacks in Atlanta, Greensboro, 
Montgomery, Selma, and across the South took a stand against Jim Crow 
segregation at bus stops, lunch counters, motels, and retail institutions. When 
direct action turned violent, rioters targeted stores that had treated them unfairly 
and destroyed ledgers documenting oppressive debt.157 Opponents of the civil 
rights movement also used consumer spaces to fight back against the movement. 
Segregationists fought integration and access to the ballot box by firing workers, 
denying Blacks public assistance, and withdrawing necessary credit and supplies 
for Black-run farms and businesses.158 The latter struck at the heart of the Black 
community’s access to consumer culture, financial markets, and wealth 
development.159 
Today’s civil rights advocates continue to recognize the relationship between 
economic citizenship and full and fair participation in our democracy. The Black 
 
note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. . . . America has given the Negro people a 
bad check, a check which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds’”); see also BARADARAN, 
supra note 142, at 140 (“King, who chose his words carefully, was asking for a financial 
reckoning.”). 
155 50 Years Ago, supra note 153; Lutton, supra note 153. 
156 See Martin Luther King, Jr., I’ve Been to the Mountaintop, Memphis, TN (Apr. 3, 
1968), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/ive-been-mountaintop-addre 
ss-delivered-bishop-charles-mason-temple [https://perma.cc/L62V-U2YD] (identifying 
economic action as tool of liberation and counseling followers to “anchor our external direct 
action with the power of economic withdrawal”). That is not to say that access to consumer 
spaces was the objective; rather, it was the means of demanding dignity. But, just as access to 
lunch counters was a symbol of full and free economic and democratic citizenship in the 
1960s, analogous access to economic and consumer spaces is equally as symbolic today. 
157 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 143-44 (“Looters destroyed the leather-bound books 
on which their debts were recorded before they destroyed anything else.”); see also Anne 
Fleming, Remaking the “Law of the Poor”: Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 
(1965), in THE POVERTY LAW CANON: EXPLORING THE MAJOR CASES 32, 32 (Marie A. 
Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016) (pointing to study of uprisings in American urban centers 
in mid-1960s concluding that “city residents had ‘[s]ignificant grievances concerning unfair 
commercial practices’” (alteration in original) (citing UNITED STATES KERNER COMMISSION, 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 274, 276 (1968))). 
158 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 13 (“[W]hen politicians and business elites mobilized 
massive resistance to southern desegregation and voter registration campaigns, thousands of 
rights activists faced job loss, eviction, coordinated denial of public assistance, and loss of 
credit and supplies crucial to their farms and businesses.”). 
159 The White Citizens’ Council in Alabama, for example, warned integrationists that they 
would register their opposition by making it impossible “to find and hold a job, get credit or 
renew a mortgage.” Id. at 56. 
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Lives Matter movement’s platform, for example, includes a call for economic 
justice, demanding “economic justice for all,” defined as “collective ownership” 
of the same economic systems that sat at the heart of the earlier civil rights 
movements, including labor markets, housing markets, and credit markets.160 
B. The Failures of Implementation 
The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment, the labor organizers of the New 
Deal civil rights movement, the original lawyers of the DOJ’s Civil Rights 
Division, the leaders of the 1960s civil rights movement, and the platform 
developers of the Black Lives Matter movement all recognized the relationship 
between economic citizenship and full and free participation in a democratic 
society. Yet, in response to each of these movements in American civil rights 
history, the protections developed in a way that dissociated economic citizenship 
from group-based political and social citizenship. Rather, the doctrines 
developed narrowly, by focusing on formal equality and compromising the laws’ 
ability to realize comprehensive group-based equality goals. 
Political pressures led to the collapse of the Freedman’s Bureau and the 
promise of land grants, exchanging real economic citizenship for the grant of 
formal political rights.161 And as labor and employment law developed, it did so 
without the broad conceptions of free labor discussed and debated by the framers 
of the Thirteenth Amendment.162 Although scholars have pointed to the framers’ 
broad conception of rights under the Thirteenth Amendment as a possible legal 
springboard for achieving anti-subordination principles,163 the doctrine, as 
 
160 Economic Justice, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://policy.m4bl.org/ 
economic-justice/ [https://perma.cc/3GCD-B4ZU] (last visited Feb. 19, 2019); Platform, THE 
MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc 
/Z6J9-L8EQ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
161 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 22 (referencing W.E.B. DuBois’s comment that “the 
Freedman’s Bureau died, and its child was the Fifteenth Amendment”). 
162 VanderVelde, supra note 144, at 498 (“Less than a decade after Reconstruction, 
however, influential treatises that codified the common law of master and servant virtually 
ignored these developments. As a result, the common law evolved without regard for the 
constitutional tradition of free labor; and that same common law has remained the law of 
employment relations in many states for most of this century.”). 
163 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 258-59 (2010) (“Since then, members of Congress enforcing the 
Thirteenth Amendment have relied on an anti-subordination model of equality, based not 
solely on equal treatment, but instead recognizing that both racial equality and economic 
rights are necessary for true equality. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress 
the authority to go beyond formal equality and remedy the socioeconomic disparities 
associated with race and gender that plagues our nation.”); see also William M. Carter, Jr., 
Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1313 (2007) (“Despite its seemingly simple command that 
‘[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States,’ the 
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developed, is unprepared to answer such a call. Due to inaction by Congress and 
deference to that inaction by the courts, the Thirteenth Amendment doctrine has 
developed narrowly.164 Courts have consistently held that the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibitions are limited to “conditions of literal slavery or 
involuntary servitude.”165 
And while the laborers of the New Deal movement made the (sometimes 
tension-filled) connection between racial justice and economic justice,166 the 
politicians effectively erased it. Lawmakers responded to the New Deal civil 
rights movement’s call for labor and economic rights by excluding Southern 
labor markets from its legal protections.167 This political maneuvering 
effectively omitted African Americans from the protections of the Social 
Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.168 By excluding agricultural and 
domestic workers from the protections of those Acts, Congress excised 
economic action from racial justice, forestalling and limiting wealth 
development in African American communities, while simultaneously creating 
protections and opportunities for wealth development in White communities.169 
 
Thirteenth Amendment’s scope remains ambiguous.”); Marco Masoni, The Green Badge of 
Slavery, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 97-98 (1994) (arguing that environmental 
degradation of Black communities is a remnant of slavery). 
164 Carter, Jr., supra note 163, at 1315 (“In the absence of a definitive statement from the 
Court, lower courts have uniformly held that the judicial power to enforce the Amendment is 
limited to conditions of literal slavery or involuntary servitude.”). 
165 Id. 
166 Forbath, supra note 10, at 702 (“By the late thirties the black vote was ‘important and 
sometimes decisive’ in scores of Northern congressional districts, and black workers had 
become a significant part of the nation’s industrial work force. With the birth of the CIO, a 
new national labor organization welcomed black workers. During the 1930s blacks were 
central to union organizing throughout the nation—in southern metal and coal mining, 
longshore, and tobacco manufacturing as well as in northern auto, steel, and meatpacking. 
Equal rights for black workers was a defining demand of the new CIO, and friend and foe 
alike agreed that the new industrial unions would not have prevailed without the militant 
support they won from blacks.”). 
167 Id. at 699 (describing how Southern Democrats allied with Northern Republicans to 
“strip[] the main pieces of New Deal legislation of any design or provision that threatened the 
separate Southern labor market and its distinctive melding of class and caste relations, its 
racial segmentation, and its low wages”); Goluboff, supra note 145, at 1678 (recognizing 
political compromise of New Deal legislation that left African Americans out of New Deal 
legislative protections). 
168 Forbath, supra note 10, at 700-01; Goluboff, supra note 145, at 1678; William M. 
Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 
5 (2012). 
169 Wiecek, supra note 168, at 5 (“Because they could not collect old-age or unemployment 
benefits, field hands, sharecroppers, maids, and nannies—constituting the bulk of the black 
labor force in the New Deal South—were shut out from even the most modest opportunity 
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Lawmakers scuttled the New Deal movement’s attempts to enact a right to a 
“job for all who can work” and the “right to seek work without 
discrimination.”170 At the same time, New Deal bank reforms were subject to 
federal support and governance of FHA and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) insurance, which were largely unavailable to Black banks 
in primarily Black neighborhoods.171 These political actions enlarged the racial 
gap in wealth development, and thus, the racial gap in economic citizenship.172 
Like the New Deal legislative accomplishments, the civil rights movement of 
the 1960s led to significant legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 1968 FHA.173 Each prohibits 
discrimination in accessing certain areas of national life: public 
accommodations, public institutions, employment, education, housing, and 
voting. Although the historic statutes made great strides in granting formal legal 
rights, they failed to address, in any meaningful way, the economic citizenship 
component of the movement’s platform.174 An excerpt from the legislative 
history of the FHA is symbolic.175 Senator Walter Mondale, of the Senate 
 
that whites enjoyed for wealth accumulation and survival assistance in economic 
downturns.”). 
170 Forbath, supra note 10, at 705. 
171 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 123 (“Certainly, under the state-by-state chartering 
regime, black banks had been denied charters as a result of discrimination, but under the new 
regime black banks rarely had enough capital to obtain charters. Black banks were almost 
categorically too weak to be granted FDIC insurance.”). 
172 Id. at 101 (“The bulk of the New Deal reforms can accurately be described as ‘white 
affirmative action’ because state resources were used to provide direct financial advantages 
to white Americans at the expense of other racial groups.”). 
173 ACKERMAN, supra note 141, at 11-19 (defining these three pieces of legislation as “civil 
rights canon”). Legal scholars and historians have challenged the idea that the civil rights 
movement, or even the civil rights canon, is limited to the battles fought and won in the 1950s 
and 1960s. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 10, at 2711; Forbath, supra note 10, at 697 (arguing 
that civil rights movement of 1950s and 1960s “had many roots in the labor movement of the 
1930s and 1940s”); Hall, supra note 149, at 1235 (identifying and describing how the “‘long 
civil rights movement’ that took root in the liberal and radical milieu of the late 1930s, was 
intimately tied to the ‘rise and fall of the New Deal Order,’ accelerated during World War II, 
stretched far beyond the South, was continuously and ferociously contested, and in the 1960s 
and 1970s inspired a ‘movement of movements’ that ‘def[ies] any narrative of collapse’” 
(footnote omitted)). 
174 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 13 (“One of the movement’s greatest challenges stemmed 
from a dilemma of political and economic disempowerment.”). There is also a compelling 
argument that the civil rights legislation does little, if anything, to address the civil rights 
movement’s goal of public integrity for the Black community, another of the movement’s 
major platform positions. See Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 154, at 1. 
175 This Part focuses on the FHA because it forms the basis of Julia’s civil rights claim. 
Similar sentiments highlighting equal access to programs can be found in the legislative 
history of other civil rights legislation. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REC. 12044, 12102 (1963) 
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Committee on Banking and Currency, explained the limitations of the “fair 
housing bill” to the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs: 
For some weeks now this subcommittee has been engaged in many efforts 
to try to deal with some of the housing problems in American ghettos. I 
believe that the proposal for fair housing which we begin to deal with today 
is a part of that effort. 
 . . .  
  . . . We must show that we don’t intend to live separately in this 
country but that we intend to live together. 
  . . . [This measure] does not purport to end the ghetto by itself. But it 
would establish a legal climate under which the abolition of the ghetto 
could be achieved. It would then be the law of economics, not civil rights, 
which would determine who buys what house and who escapes the 
ghetto.176 
Leaders in the civil rights movement fought for access to economic systems, 
and yet those action items are conspicuously absent from the antidiscrimination 
civil rights canon.177 
As the statutes and doctrines responded to these civil rights moments in 
American history, economic protections were excised from “traditional” civil 
rights protections based on protected classes. Congress omitted economic 
citizenship rights from antidiscrimination legislation and the Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that economic rights are fundamental.178 As an example, one 
need only look to the weakness of the FHA’s requirement to affirmatively 
further fair housing. The statute requires that “[a]ll executive departments and 
 
(containing Senator Philip Hart’s speech in support of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
in which he applauded the legislation’s recognition that the United States is “a Nation that 
treats all its people with equal hand and equal justice, and does not have one window marked 
‘white’ and another window marked ‘colored,’ in order that taxpayers, white and colored 
alike, may participate in Federal programs”). 
176 Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearing on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 
2 (1967) (statement of Sen. Mondale, S. Comm. on Banking and Currency). 
177 Professor Mehrsa Baradaran makes a strong case that, instead of investing in the idea 
of economic citizenship, every administration since the Nixon Administration has instead 
relied on the idea of Black banking and Black capitalism to solve the economic crisis related 
to race. BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 1-2. She further argues, backed by significant 
historical data and analysis, that “Black banking has been an anemic response to racial 
inequality that has yielded virtually nothing in closing the wealth gap.” Id. at 2. 
178 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) (declining to find substantive right 
to welfare benefits and applying rational basis review to restrictions on those benefits); 
Zietlow, supra note 163, at 258 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 29-39 (1973) (declining to find fundamental right to education in rejecting challenge to 
property tax-based funding of public schools)). 
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agencies . . . administer their programs and activities relating to housing and 
urban development . . . in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes [of the 
FHA].”179 Although HUD released its rule providing guidance on the Act’s 
requirement to affirmatively further fair housing in 2015 (forty-seven years after 
the Act’s passage),180 the general consensus is that the requirement to 
affirmatively further fair housing has had little effect on segregation, housing 
discrimination, or the ability of African Americans to develop property and 
wealth through home ownership.181 And before the rule could make any inroads 
into changing those outcomes, the Trump Administration, under the leadership 
of HUD Secretary Ben Carson, has delayed its implementation182 and aggressive 
enforcement appears unlikely.183 
 
179 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2012). 
180 Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42271, 42371 (Aug. 17, 2015) 
(“[A public housing agency] must establish . . . that it has complied with fair housing and civil 
rights laws and regulations, or has remedied violations of fair housing and civil rights laws 
and regulations, and has adopted policies and undertaken actions to affirmatively further fair 
housing.”). 
181 See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, Living Apart: How the Government Betrayed a 
Landmark Civil Rights Law, PROPUBLICA (June 25, 2015, 1:26 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/living-apart-how-the-government-betrayed-a-landmark-
civil-rights-law [https://perma.cc/YYJ8-8JWL] (“Perhaps the starkest measure of the law’s 
squandered potential is how little the torrent of federal dollars released by its passage has done 
to integrate U.S. communities.”); Shanna L. Smith, Incorporating Fair Housing into 
Affordable Housing Policy and Programs, J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L., Winter 
2011, at 235, 235-36 (“Congress made clear its intent that the Fair Housing Act have two 
goals: to eliminate housing discrimination and to promote residential integration. Both goals 
have been virtually ignored by the federal government. In subsequent appropriations bills, 
Congress included a requirement that recipients of federal dollars must ‘affirmatively further 
fair housing.’ However, most recipients of federal dollars have never complied with this 
requirement.”). 
182 Kriston Capps, The Trump Administration Just Derailed a Key Obama Rule on Housing 
Segregation, CITYLAB (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/the-trump-
administration-derailed-a-key-obama-rule-on-housing-segregation/549746/ 
[https://perma.cc/3BXT-E4KY] (“The Trump administration is rolling back the deadline for 
a key rule on fair housing made into law under President Barack Obama—a change with 
potentially broad consequences for racial segregation. The new guidance will give 
communities until well after 2020 to comply with an Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing 
rule put in place two years ago.”). 
183 Secretary Carson’s previous statements rejecting the notion of affirmatively furthering 
fair housing suggest that it will not gain traction any time soon. Ben S. Carson, Opinion, 
Experimenting with Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-try-
to-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/EQ8U-8XMR] (critiquing HUD’s rule on affirmatively 
furthering fair housing and referring to it as “social-engineering”); see also BARADARAN, 
supra note 142, at 170 (arguing that, after George Romney’s retirement as HUD Secretary in 
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Congress’s and courts’ hesitance to recognize the relationship between 
economic citizenship and civil rights is consistent with the critiques of the 
antidiscrimination doctrine as formalistic and rigid.184 The design of 
antidiscrimination law, especially as connected to intentional discrimination, 
represents a turn from structural equality and economic citizenship concerns to 
prohibition of discrimination against specific and targeted individuals.185 As 
discussed in detail in Part I, the protected class design of antidiscrimination law 
has been understood and analyzed narrowly by the judiciary. Such a constrained 
view, focused on the individual plaintiff’s identity, has operated to create 
significant obstacles to attaining judicial relief and combatting entrenched 
discrimination.186 Some scholars have gone so far as to consider the 
antidiscrimination doctrine a wholesale failure in its attempts to remedy group-
based discrimination and achieve structural anti-subordination goals.187 Even for 
 
1972, administrations would uniformly “follow Nixon’s strategy of enforcing the FHA 
through litigating cases of outright discrimination . . . mak[ing] it clear that [they] would only 
concern [themselves] with racial and not economic discrimination”). 
184 Zietlow, supra note 163, at 255-56 (“Notwithstanding the powerful symbolism that 
liberty has in the American psyche, liberty is largely absent from our late twentieth century 
understanding of civil rights, which instead is based on the Equal Protection Clause and its 
promise of formal equality. People of color and women of every race have made significant 
advances under the equal protection model of equality, but they continue to lag behind whites 
and men under virtually every economic index.” (emphasis omitted)). 
185 Antidiscrimination law is not devoid of avenues to address structural discrimination. 
For example, disparate impact is a means by which to challenge structural bias. See Bradley 
A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 
955, 960-67 (2012) (tracing antisubordination principles historically embedded in 
employment discrimination law); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits 
of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 22 (2006) (“Taken as a whole, . . . disparate 
impact inquiry asks whether some aspect of the employer’s structural arrangement facilitates 
or reflects biased decisionmaking, and whether the employer could reasonably structure 
things differently to avoid that result.”). For intentional discrimination claims under Title VII 
and other antidiscrimination statutes, however, the design of the law is focused on a bad actor 
and an individual victim, leaving little room to address institutional or structural 
discrimination factors. 
186 See Clarke, supra note 42, at 167 (arguing that statutory design of antidiscrimination 
law does not require that plaintiff prove that she is member of protected class to gain access 
to protections, but that antidiscrimination doctrine has developed, primarily through 
application of McDonnell Douglas test, to apply such requirement); supra Section I.B 
(discussing antidiscrimination law’s class design and doctrine limiting ability of plaintiffs to 
advance claims for judicial relief). 
187 Some scholars reject the antidiscrimination approach to equity because the design and 
implementation of the laws fail to remedy the actual needs of historically disenfranchised 
groups in favor of individual and isolated rights. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content 
of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 95-96 (1999) (asserting that rights-based 
civil rights model was borne out of an understanding of the White experience, resulting in 
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those who find significant value in the current antidiscrimination doctrine, 
however, it is clear that the antidiscrimination doctrine has fallen short in 
achieving economic citizenship. 
III. THE NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
Once it is clear that the consumer protection doctrine provides a doctrinal 
avenue to remedy certain forms of discrimination, it remains necessary to 
contend with the normative implications of using consumer protection to remedy 
group-based harms like race or sex discrimination. Part I detailed the doctrinal 
benefits and drawbacks of claims arising out of antidiscrimination law and 
consumer protection law—the different remedies available, the relative ease of 
proving the elements of each kind of claim, and the effect of the different venue 
options. Part II set out the historical context, tracing the role of economic 
citizenship in the fight for civil rights, its omission from the resulting 
antidiscrimination law and doctrine, and the structural failures of the resulting 
antidiscrimination doctrine. Recognizing the pragmatic benefit of the consumer 
protection doctrine to remedy discrimination, this Part contends with the 
downstream consequences that might flow from turning to a consumer 
protection claim to remedy traditional civil rights violations. Situated in the 
literature on colorblind, universalist, and race-conscious approaches to civil 
rights concerns, this Part recognizes that making such a choice could operate to 
erase subordination, oppression, and entrenched bias from the lawsuit. As law is 
one critical tool in developing social understanding and norms, “hiding” 
discrimination in a consumer protection claim could undermine civil rights 
advocacy and protection, and risk perpetuating and further entrenching 
inequalities. 
A. The Debate over Universalist Approaches 
Remedying discrimination using consumer protection law is a universalist 
approach to a civil rights problem. As the name suggests, universalist 
approaches to civil rights violations are universal in their application and neutral 
as to race, gender, disability, and other traditional identity-based protected 
classes.188 Universalist protections, rights, or policies do not award or cabin 
 
laws that failed to meet critical needs such as social and economic justice); Mark Tushnet, An 
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (critiquing rights-based theory and 
arguing that focus on rights obstructs progressive advances); see also Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. 
L. REV. 1253, 1296-97 (2011) (explaining development and history of “so-called rights 
critique,” which was “actually a multifaceted debate that included hard and soft lines on both 
sides”). But see Crenshaw, Race, supra note 59, at 1356-58 (recognizing both possibilities 
and dangers of rights-based approach to civil rights and racial equality). 
188 Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2842 (defining “universalist approach to civil rights law as 
one that either guarantees a uniform floor of rights or benefits for all persons or, at least, 
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rights via protected classes or other group-based identifiers. In that way, 
universalist approaches differ both structurally and substantively from rights and 
protections created through antidiscrimination statutes. Scholars across 
constitutional and civil rights fields have analyzed and proposed universalist 
approaches for workplace discrimination,189 voter discrimination and 
suppression,190 and discrimination against people with disabilities,191 for 
example. Those proposals utilize universalist laws and approaches across a 
varied spectrum, from litigation to legislation to policymaking. 
For some, the universalist approach is rooted in a rejection of a rights-based 
approach to equality. Professor Richard Thompson Ford, for example, sets out a 
laundry list of complaints about rights-based approaches based on their 
downstream consequences.192 He argues, for example, that rights-based 
approaches encourage narcissism and extremism.193 Ford complains that “[t]he 
rhetoric of civil rights law has provided a convenience vehicle, if not an official 
apologia, for a culture of entitlement, self-obsession, and self-righteousness that 
warps popular politics and poisons popular culture.”194 This Article rejects those 
contentions. To the contrary, this Article suggests that rights-based 
antidiscrimination law has not gone far enough to protect Americans against 
group- and identity-based discrimination. 
 
guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a broad group of people not defined according to the 
identity axes (e.g., race, sex) highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws”). 
189 Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (proposing 
claims arising under Family and Medical Leave Act to remedy workplace inequality); Eyer, 
supra note 54, at 1343 (pointing to Family and Medical Leave Act as an alternate, universalist 
claim to remedy workplace discrimination). 
190 Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
95, 113-25 (2013) (arguing for universal regulatory oversight of voting in wake of Supreme 
Court’s Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), decision finding Voting Rights Act’s 
section 5 unconstitutional); Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From 
Antidiscrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 748-55 (2006) (defending 
universalist approach to voting rights in the context of 2006 Voting Rights Act 
reauthorization). 
191 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 70-75 (2004) 
(explaining advantages of advancing universal social welfare programs over targeted 
programs to advance interests of people with disabilities). 
192 RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE 
FOR EQUALITY 20-25 (2011). 
193 Id. at 23-24 (arguing that rights extremism has been reinforced and perpetuated by 
popular culture, which has led to culture of entitlement and self-entitlement). 
194 Id. at 24. Ford also critiques rights-based civil rights laws because they obscure 
complexity, fail to challenge institutional and cultural injustices, limit the opportunity for 
cooperative and pragmatic solutions, risk being exploited at the expense of common sense, 
and crowd out new and creative means of achieving social justice. Id. at 19-25. 
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Other scholars propose a turn toward universalist approaches as a pragmatic 
solution to both a jurisprudential and cultural aversion to group-based rights and 
protections.195 The concept is that judges, juries, legislators, and society at large 
will be more responsive to claims that do not rely on group-based, identity-
driven rights and protections.196 This Article aligns itself more with those 
scholarly approaches. Recognizing the failures of antidiscrimination law to 
achieve group-based equality goals, this Article suggests that consumer 
protection is an untapped resource to better achieve these goals. Because 
economic rights are inextricably linked to civil rights, however, this Article 
further argues that consumer protection law usefully aligns with and 
supplements the objectives of civil rights law. 
Universalist approaches, however, have been met with significant and 
compelling critique. Primarily, critics contend that universalist approaches 
adopt, and thus condone, a post-racial197 colorblind perception of modern 
America. The “colorblind” model198—a belief that the country has moved 
beyond race and that each individual should be evaluated on his or her own 
merits—has taken hold in our courts,199 our classrooms,200 and our national 
 
195 See Eyer, supra note 54, at 1299 (suggesting that seeking “extra-discrimination 
remedies” may allow plaintiffs to successfully sidestep judges’ and juries’ cultural and 
psychological aversion to ascribing discrimination to almost any set of circumstances, 
including those with direct evidence of animus). 
196 Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2848 (explaining why proponents of universalist legislation 
and litigation advocacy “[posit] that universalist approaches are more durable” politically and 
when challenged in court); Darby & Levy, supra note 64, at 389-90 (arguing in light of deeply 
entrenched post-racial judicial and national narrative, advocates must embrace “postracial 
remedies” as “essential tools for realizing egalitarian aspirations in our racially exhausted 
society”); Yoshino, supra note 62, at 750 (suggesting that liberty-based dignity claims under 
substantive due process framework may find greater success than equity-based equal 
protection claims because the former “offers a way for the Court to ‘do’ equality in an era of 
increasing pluralism anxiety”). 
197 Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 12 (defining “post-racial” as “a set of beliefs 
that coalesce to posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by 
America’s and Americans’ pronounced racial progress” (footnote omitted)). 
198 Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the 
Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 51 (1995) (“Colorblindness is based on the concept that, 
because race is immutable and arbitrary, race should be ignored in the allocation of burdens 
and benefits.”). 
199 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing possible explanations for 
shift in Supreme Court’s attitude toward robust group-based equal protection); see also 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (2007) (reviewing dangers of color-blind approach to criminal justice). 
200 Cf. Robert A. Blake, Jr., A Step Towards a Colorblind Society: Shaw v. Reno, 29 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 937, 952-53 (1994) (discussing Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Wygant 
v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), which applied strict scrutiny to strike 
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image.201 A critical review of the current state of American society, however, 
presents clear evidence that individual and systemic bias against people based 
on race, sex, national origin, and disability, among other traits and 
characteristics, remains pervasive in America.202 In other words, even 
proponents’ ideal of colorblindness is not the reality. In fact, as many scholars 
argue, the false narrative of colorblindness operates to obscure, perpetuate, and 
even advance racism and other biases.203 
Even recognizing that universalist approaches afford some pragmatic benefit 
to victims of discrimination, Professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, the 
architect of intersectionality theory and a prominent critical race theorist, warns 
against “post-racial pragmatism.”204 She admonishes post-racial pragmatists for 
condoning the existing power structure without naming or checking it.205 Rather 
than framing universalist approaches as legitimate, pragmatic responses to a 
colorblind jurisprudence, Crenshaw warns that post-racial pragmatism “brings 
 
down lay-off program which discharged white teachers at higher rate than Black teachers, 
even though program did not discriminate against historically discriminated group). 
201 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 11-12 (2010) (recognizing that colorblindness is a “public consensus that 
prevails in America today” and arguing that such sense has “blinded us to the realities of race 
in our society”); Crenshaw, supra note 187, at 1314 (“An entire industry of lawyers, 
politicians, pundits, and foundations has worked over the past twenty years to convince 
judges, policy makers, and voters that the project of racial reform was completed long ago.”); 
cf. Jamin B. Raskin, From “Colorblind” White Supremacy to American Multiculturalism, 19 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 750-52 (1996) (arguing that nation is on fast-track to 
multiculturalism, and that embracing such diversity is critical to moving past “regime of white 
supremacy”). 
202 See ALEXANDER, supra note 201, at 4 (detailing ways in which criminal justice system 
has “emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social 
control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow”); MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & 
ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 94-122 (2013) 
(revealing, through psychological studies and tests, hidden (or implicit) biases that shape our 
judgments about people’s abilities, characters, and potential). 
203 See Chase, supra note 198, at 47 (arguing that colorblindness serves to obscure “root, 
scope, and depth of the problem” and to “defend the unwitting racist”); Crenshaw, supra note 
187, at 1326 (arguing that colorblindness has been used as “justification for civil rights 
rollbacks”); Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility 
and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901, 910 (1997) (arguing that 
failure to explicitly deal with race and gender does not erase subordination, but instead 
perpetuates it). 
204 See Crenshaw, supra note 187, at 1314 (“This pragmatism jettisons the liberal 
ambivalence about race consciousness to embrace a colorblind stance even as it foregrounds 
and celebrates the achievement of particular racial outcomes.”). 
205 Id. at 1332 (arguing that, by failing to challenge the institutional power structure, post-
racialism “permits a deeper alignment with forces that deny that significant racial barriers 
remain”). 
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rock star marketability to colorblindness’s legitimizing project.”206 Other 
scholars warn against “post-racial hydraulics,” which are negative downstream 
consequences for embracing universalist approaches to employment 
discrimination.207 They argue that ignoring group-based discrimination in favor 
of universalist claims will stagnate the antidiscrimination doctrine, reinforce the 
view that discrimination is a rare phenomenon, discourage lawyers from taking 
discrimination cases, and push universalist approaches on clients without 
respecting their autonomy and voice.208 Even those who have urged a 
universalist response in certain arenas recognize the drawbacks to such an 
approach, including the fact that the broad strokes to such an approach may be 
less efficient or may result in backlash or “compassion fatigue.”209 
The following draws on the debate over universalist approaches to consider 
specifically what may be gained or lost by adopting consumer protection as a 
lens for remedying certain forms of discrimination.210 This Article frames the 
choice of a consumer protection approach as a substitute for a civil rights 
approach, evaluating each as relative to the other. Although the Article analyzes 
antidiscrimination law and consumer protection law as substitutes for each other, 
it is not necessary to choose between the two claims for remedying 
discrimination. In fact, the two claims could be both substitutes and 
complements for organizing remedial demands.211 A litigation strategy relying 
on consumer protection law could be part of a coordinated effort to address 
certain forms of discrimination through litigation, legislation, and non-legal 
means without limiting those extra-judicial methods to universalist strategies. 
Even among proponents of universalist approaches to remedying traditional civil 
rights issues, scholars have explicitly recognized that the universalist approach 
need not (and should not) be treated as a singular strategy.212 
A litigant like Julia could also stack her legal claims, pleading both violations 
of civil rights law and consumer protection law. Although this Article frames 
Julia’s claim choice as either/or (consumer protection or antidiscrimination), 
Julia could stack the claims by asserting violations of both (or multiple) laws. 
This Article treats antidiscrimination and consumer protection claims as 
 
206 Id. at 1326. 
207 Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 41-43. 
208 Id. at 7; see also Kennedy, supra note 11, at 292-93 (rejecting universalist approach to 
dealing with consumer discrimination because, even in their successes, universalist claims do 
not “recognize the true nature of the harm—differential treatment because of their race”). 
209 Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2852. 
210 See Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 41-43; Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2841. 
211 See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 58-59 (2011). 
212 See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2841(recognizing that universalistic approaches can, 
and should, exist alongside particularistic approaches to address civil rights problems); Eyer, 
supra note 54, at 1357 (proposing “some balance between the remedies that will most 
effectively serve putative victims of discrimination now and the strategies that will most 
effectively enhance the public salience of discrimination in the long-term”). 
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alternates rather than complements for two reasons. First, such a frame offers a 
cleaner lens for both the doctrinal and normative trade-off analysis. Second, the 
focus here is on substitutes because there are significant risks and downsides to 
stacking the claims. The consumer protection claims are likely to take a back 
seat to the more complex and discovery-driven discrimination claims, opening 
the plaintiff up to the downsides of the antidiscrimination claim without seeing 
much benefit from adding the consumer protection claim. 
B. The Negative: The Drawbacks of the Universalist Approach Outweigh the 
Benefits 
Relying exclusively on consumer protection law to remedy discrimination 
suffers from the overarching critiques of universalist approaches. It obscures the 
element of bias, which arguably pardons the perpetrator of discrimination. It 
diminishes the number of cases brought asserting housing or other 
discrimination, which may have a long-term negative effect on the doctrine or 
the social understanding of the rampant nature of housing discrimination.213 
Additionally, by divorcing the discrimination from the economic implications, 
it risks shrouding “the material consequences of racial exploitation and social 
violence—including the persistence of educational inequity, the 
disproportionate racial patterns of criminalization and incarceration, and the 
deepening patterns of economic stratification.”214 In fact, it risks reinforcing the 
Supreme Court’s recent turn from robust group-based civil rights protections; if 
consumer protection affords an adequate remedy, identity-dependent civil rights 
protections become less necessary. Scholars often talk about “naming” a 
phenomenon; there is something about identifying and calling out an issue in the 
law that gives the issue credibility, urgency, and visibility.215 In fact, much has 
been written about the power to call one’s abuser to account and, with the full 
power of the judicial system listening, name the source of the injustice.216 By 
ignoring the connection between a victim’s identity characteristics (i.e. race or 
gender) and the perpetrator’s adverse actions, consumer protection law ignores 
 
213 Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 76 (warning that universalist strategies 
reinforce courts’ and society’s view that discrimination is rare phenomenon). 
214 Crenshaw, supra note 187, at 1327 (footnotes omitted). 
215 See, e.g., Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 322 (1998) (pointing to Betty Friedan’s work as beginning of feminist 
theorists’ work to “ensure that the question of naming would emerge as a fundamental issue 
and as a hallmark of contemporary feminist theory”); cf. Laura A. Heymann, Naming, 
Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 407-08 (recognizing that power to name is 
power in and of itself). 
216 See Leissner, supra note 215, at 328 (“In order to be redressed, therefore, a harm must 
possess a name in law. One need only look at workplace sexual harassment, date rape, 
domestic violence, marital rape, and adultery to comprehend the importance of naming a 
harm.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the institutional racial discrimination, and other biases, that have shaped our 
national economy.217  
The specific consumer context also raises concerns related to the attention 
that market-driven consumer law pays to individual choices and responsibility. 
Consumer law relies on and adopts America’s capitalist culture. In fact, a 
building block of the tort and contract law upon which consumer protection law 
was built is the concept of caveat emptor.218 Such a concept is born of a “laissez-
faire philosophy that placed a premium on individual bargaining skills and 
minimal government interference in standards of fair play.”219 Although the 
1960s consumer movement for consumer protections was driven, in part, by a 
recognition of the danger of power and information asymmetry in consumer 
transactions, the system still operates within a market-driven capitalist structure.  
America’s capitalist culture privileges the “pull yourself up by your 
bootstraps,” “American Dream” kind of mentality. The concept of individual 
merit and responsibility is so deeply connected to capitalism that it is hard to 
pull the two apart. Thus, relying on consumer law, with its focus on individual 
merit and responsibility, risks erasing more than just the role of bias or 
discrimination in the transaction. Rather, it risks adopting and reinforcing a 
system that elevates individual choice and intention above all; a system that 
often ignores the role of structural and institutional forces.220 Structural, 
governmental, and institutional forces have limited the ability of traditionally 
oppressed groups in the United States to participate fully in consumer capitalism 
and to gain economic citizenship.221 In fact, “[c]apitalist theory was even used 
 
217 See, e.g., Chase, supra note 198, at 5-6 (exposing ways in which slavery and racial 
oppression have shaped contract law, which has “became the means by which African-
Americans became inalienably disempowered; outsiders to the system of justice and equitable 
economic opportunity”); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 
94 YALE L.J. 997, 1002-03 (1985) (recognizing how contract law has failed women by 
stereotyping them into binary and closed roles). 
218 Frederick C. Wamhoff, Property—Caveat Emptor—Duty to Disclose Limited to 
Commercial Vendors. Ollerman v. O’Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) and 
Kanack v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426, 291 N.W.2d 864 (1980), 64 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 548 
(1981) (“The more lengthy expression is caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit quod jus 
alienum emit which means let a purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of the amount and 
nature of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper caution.”). 
219 Robert Kwong, Fraud and the Duty to Disclose Off-Site Land Conditions: Actual 
Knowledge vs. Seller Status, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 897, 901 (1997) (citing Wamhoff, 
supra note 218, at 552). 
220 See TRESSIE MCMILLIAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING RISE OF FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY 187 (2017) (arguing that “perpetuating the inequalities 
resulting from intergenerational cumulative disadvantage doesn’t require intent” and that 
“racism and sexism work best of all when intent is not a prerequisite”). 
221 See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, at vii-viii (2017) (arguing that legacy of de jure 
  
2019] CONSUMER REMEDIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 637 
 
to fight basic antidiscrimination laws.”222 By ignoring the effects of generations 
of structural bias and oppression, “hiding” discrimination claims in a consumer 
law context risks erasing, and thus reinforcing, the problems of structural bias in 
our consumer and financial sectors. 
C. The Affirmative: The Benefits of the Universalist Approach Outweigh the 
Drawbacks 
There is, however, a flip side of the normative coin. While relying on a 
universalist tool to remedy civil rights violations might obscure the element of 
bias, the trade-off is a higher likelihood of success. In Julia’s case, the doctrinal 
analysis resulted in a seemingly large differential in the likelihood of succeeding 
on her consumer protection claim relative to her discrimination claim. UDAP 
statutes are read broadly and have fewer essential elements of proof. Julia need 
not prove discrimination or intentional bias, which empiricists have established 
is not an easy task, especially as discrimination has become more subtle and 
harder to prove.223 UDAP statutes are friendlier to intersectional plaintiffs like 
Julia, who are not forced to either identify or prove which thread of their 
identities led to the adverse or discriminatory action, an undertaking that 
theorists have established is nearly impossible and counter-productive.224 This 
likelihood of success has implications for Julia and for society at large. 
First and foremost, it achieves Julia’s goals. It is impossible and unethical to 
ignore the client’s desire for a legal remedy in analyzing these normative 
 
structural segregation at local, state, and federal levels—even more than intentional individual 
discrimination—created and promoted wide-spread neighborhood racial segregation that 
persists today); Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 
1081 (2017) (“The 20:1 wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in the United States is not a 
manifestation of cultural or individual differences, but the product of a long history of 
discriminatory laws and policies that inscribed racial disparities into society.”); see also 
BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 164-214 (tracing how focus on “black capitalism,” without 
simultaneous reckoning with historic and systemic limitations on wealth development in 
Black communities, was “deployed as a decoy instead of an honest account of a systemic 
problem”). 
222 BARADARAN, supra note 142, at 210 (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM (1962)). 
223 Eyer, supra note 54, at 1276 (noting “less than 5% of all discrimination plaintiffs will 
ever achieve any form of litigated relief”); see also Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, 
at 14-15 (citing studies and scholars concluding that employment discrimination cases are 
difficult to prove, vulnerable to summary judgment rulings, and face uphill battles because 
judges and juries believe that employment discrimination has been largely eradicated). 
224 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 149-50 (“Black women’s experiences are much 
broader than the general categories that discrimination discourse provides. Yet the continued 
insistence that Black women’s demands and needs be filtered through categorical analyses 
that completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom be 
addressed.”). 
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questions. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct make clear that a lawyer 
has a duty to zealously advocate for her client’s position “despite opposition, 
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer” and “take whatever lawful 
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”225 
Although opponents of universalist approaches to civil rights issues critique 
pragmatist-lawyers, they do so without a convincing answer to a client facing a 
losing discrimination action. For example, in their compelling critique of 
universalist proposals and identification of the secondary post-racial hydraulics, 
Professors Alexander, Eigen, and Rich give little more than a nod to a lawyer’s 
responsibility to achieve the client’s goals.226 When the client’s goal is to recover 
money or otherwise succeed on a legal claim, does a lawyer not have a 
responsibility to find a viable legal claim that will achieve that goal? Alexander, 
Eigen, and Rich acknowledge that empirical studies evidence low success rates 
for employment discrimination plaintiffs and interviews with employment 
attorneys establish that Title VII cases are nearly impossible to win in court.227 
Yet they simultaneously condemn pragmatist-lawyers for choosing alternate 
universalist claims, arguing that the short-term win for the client is not worth the 
long-term harm to racial justice.228 That might well be the case in the abstract, 
but it sits in conflict with the lawyer’s ethical duty to the client, a foremost 
responsibility in lawyering.229 
Second, there are long-term adverse consequences to racial justice initiatives 
if plaintiffs in discrimination suits lose in court. A loss in court, even one based 
on technical or evidentiary barriers, officially pardons the perpetrator for his 
conduct. Additionally, losses in discrimination actions reinforce the notion that 
discrimination claims have no merit, create bad precedent, and negatively affect 
the individual client and her community. In other words, pursuit of the losing 
argument may do more harm than good. Not only does the individual client lose 
possible damages and incur the financial and emotional costs of the lawsuit, but 
the antidiscrimination doctrine is padded with one more negative opinion. 
 
225 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
226 See Alexander, Eigen & Rich, supra note 6, at 51-52 (dismissing importance of client 
goals by stating that although “[s]ome plaintiffs will prefer the substitution of a universalist 
claim . . . [t]heir reasons for preferring universalism, however, may stem from disturbing 
factors that we should disrupt rather than accept as a matter of course”). 
227 Id. at 12, 33-37 (“As an initial matter, the attorneys in our sample were united in their 
judgment that winning a Title VII claim in federal court is much harder today than in the past 
and in their perception that FLSA claims can be substantially easier to litigate, and thus more 
viable, than Title VII claims.”). 
228 Id. at 12, 20 (criticizing universalist strategies, stating “[t]he mistake in such strategies 
is in emphasizing short term ‘wins’ rather than taking on the more difficult project of 
educating and persuading persons who are unprepared to recognize contemporary racism”). 
229 Serious attention should be paid to the ethical implications of the universalist versus 
particularist debate in the civil rights literature. While a thorough analysis is beyond the scope 
of this Article, I look forward to taking it up in a future project. 
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There is also an argument that the universality of consumerism offers a point 
of connection across which coalitions might be forged and experiences 
shared.230 As President Kennedy reminded Congress in 1962, “Consumers, by 
definition, include us all.”231 Consumer law and protection offer a potential lens 
through which those with different backgrounds could find common ground. 
This is particularly salient in the consumer protection context today. Americans 
are still reeling from deep-seated fraud and deception of consumers that led to 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession. Scholars and advocates 
have made the profound connection between the predatory and discriminatory 
conduct aimed at vulnerable communities and the deep and lasting effects on the 
entire national economy.232 It is, perhaps, a singular moment for varied and 
diverse groups to recognize that our consumer culture’s failure to afford 
universal economic citizenship negatively affects both the direct targets of 
discrimination and the entire national culture and economy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article reviews the potential connections and disconnections between 
the consumer protection and antidiscrimination policies and doctrines. While it 
does not argue that consumer protection law is always a better avenue to 
remedying relevant discrimination than traditional antidiscrimination law,233 it 
offers a framework through which advocates, policymakers, and scholars can 
consider the claims. It observes that the civil rights movements and their leaders 
understood the inextricable relationship between economic and civil rights. It 
also recognizes that the antidiscrimination law, as developed, omits economic 
citizenship and leaves many victims of discrimination out of its protection. It 
suggests, therefore, that consumer protection may, perhaps paradoxically, better 
achieve certain civil rights goals than the antidiscrimination framework. 
Thus, this Article asserts that, for victims of discrimination like Julia, and 
others who are consistently left out of the rigid protections of antidiscrimination 
 
230 See Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 2848-74 (arguing that one expressive benefit of 
universalist approach is de-essentializing of identity and opportunity to build unexpected 
coalitions). 
231 President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Protecting the Consumer 
Interest, in 1962 PUB. PAPERS 235, 235 (Mar. 15, 1962). 
232 See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial 
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 8 (2009) (“The frightening aspect, however, is that what 
began as a subprime lending problem has spread to other, less-risky mortgages, and 
contributed to excess home inventories, defaults, and foreclosures that have pushed down 
home prices for even the most responsible borrowers and homeowners.”); Christopher L. 
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2189 (2007) (“A host of 
empirical studies leaves no serious doubt that predatory mortgage lending is a significant 
problem for American society.”). 
233 See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 141, at 434 (warning scholars against coming to any 
“grand, absolutist theories about courts, lawyers, and social change”). 
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law, consumer protection is a valid and valuable alternative. And it goes further. 
It reflects on the words of Richard Cordray, the first director of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau: 
The foundations of justice and equality are essential in our economic affairs 
if we are each to find our way toward earning the fulfillment of our goals 
and aspirations. . . . [I]f we are to attain a true and full understanding of 
civil rights in this country, it must encompass not only political and legal 
rights, but also economic rights. . . . So together with the related rights to 
obtain money, to hold money, and to deploy money on fair and equal terms, 
the right to credit or fair lending becomes a basic pillar of the economic 
rights that are intertwined with civil rights in this particular society.234 
Consumer protection is and should be seen as a tool in the fight for civil rights. 
Such an approach is not limited to factual situations identical to Julia’s. 
Consumer protection law might be applied to unlawful pre-employment 
contracts.235 It may apply to prospective students.236 The analysis herein could 
be applied to situations traditionally arising under Title II,237 which involves 
discrimination in public accommodations, and Title III,238 which involves 
discrimination in public institutions. Federal consumer protection laws prohibit 
misrepresentations in lending (Truth in Lending Act239 and Equal Credit 
 
234 Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Lecture on Economic 
Rights as Civil Rights at Michigan State University (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.consumer 
finance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-director-richard-cordrays-prepared-lecture-on-
economic-rights-as-civil-rights-at-michigan-state-university/ [https://perma.cc/R9FE-
BVBM]. 
235 See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 519 S.E.2d 308, 312 (N.C. 1999) (finding sufficient 
facts and circumstances existed to extend UDAP protections to individuals in employer-
employee relationship where it was not a general employer/employee dispute and the actions 
affected commerce); Gress v. Rowboat Co., 661 S.E.2d 278, 282 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) 
(finding that general presumption against application of the UDTPA did not apply outside of 
true employer-employee relationship). 
236 See, e.g., Elmendorf v. Duke Univ., No. 1:14-cv-00697, 2015 WL 4094175, at *2 
(M.D.N.C. July 7, 2015) (declining to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under North Carolina UDTPA 
based on allegations that defendant engaged in conduct, including making false statements, 
to induce plaintiff to enroll at Duke rather than Princeton). 
237 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment 
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of 
public accommodation.”). 
238 Id. § 2000b (stating Attorney General may institute civil actions when notified by 
individual of “being deprived of or threatened with the loss of his right to the equal protection 
of the laws, on account of his race, color, religion, or national origin, by being denied equal 
utilization of any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of any 
State or subdivision thereof”). 
239 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a 
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
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Opportunity Act),240 debt collection (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act),241 
leasing (Consumer Leasing Act),242 credit reporting (Fair Credit Reporting 
Act),243 and real estate mortgage servicing (Real Estate Settlements Procedures 
Act).244 There are many opportunities to consider the role that consumer 
protection law can play in effectuating traditional civil rights goals, especially 
as between economic and civil rights. 
Today, consumer protections sit at a crossroads. Major legislation like the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and significant 
government oversight through the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau are 
facing legal and political challenges.245 This Article suggests that a deeper 
understanding of the historical and modern connections between civil rights and 
consumer protection will prove useful to the national conversation on these 
issues. It challenges advocates, policymakers, and scholars to consider the role 
of economic rights in antidiscrimination law and the role of antidiscrimination 
in consumer protection law. 
 
 
 
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and 
to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.”). 
240 Id. § 1691 (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, 
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex or marital status, or age.”). 
241 Id. § 1692 (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection 
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive 
debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State 
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”). 
242 Id. § 1667 (providing certain requirements for disclosure regarding personal property 
leases). 
243 Id. § 1681 (“There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their 
grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to 
privacy.”). 
244 27 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to effect certain 
changes in the settlement process for residential real estate that will result—(1) in more 
effective advance disclosure to home buyers and sellers of settlement costs; (2) in the 
elimination of kickbacks or referral fees that tend to increase unnecessarily the costs of certain 
settlement services; (3) in a reduction in the amounts home buyers are required to place in 
escrow accounts established to insure the payment of real estate taxes and insurance; and (4) 
in significant reform and modernization of local recordkeeping of land title information.”). 
245 See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en 
banc, 881 F.3d 75, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (reversing court’s prior ruling that Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau’s structure was unconstitutional); Gillian B. White, Trump 
Begins to Chip Away at Banking Regulations, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/trump-dodd-frank/515646/ [https://pe 
rma.cc/N8VA-HP83] (detailing President Trump’s plans to scale back significant provisions 
of Dodd-Frank legislation and target Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). 
